Framed Portrayals - Printed media representations of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia (2016-2018)

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In the past few decades, media has assumed an increasingly important role in shaping social and political understandings of the world. This is true across the world and its importance is magnified whenever the society it depicts is one of imbalances and inequalities. Such is the case in Bolivia, where centuries of colonialism, exploitation, discrimination, and injustices have created an immense gap between the Indigenous majority and a *criollo* minority, across all aspects of social, economic, and political life.

After Evo Morales' ascent to the presidency in 2006, Indigenous Peoples became the archetype for national citizenry, in a sharp contrast with their image under much of Bolivia's history as a country. After the refounding of the nation as the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2009, Indigenous Peoples were given a sociopolitical emphasis befitting of their representativeness, a volte-face contested by many.

Coupled with these great changes in Bolivian society was the media (and particularly online media) growth registered in the last few decades. Its role as a political watchdog and as a social tone-setter became exponentially magnified, especially in its portrayal of Indigenous Peoples, no longer a marginal sociopolitical player in Bolivia but at the front and centre of national politics.

This study analyses how Bolivian media portrays the country's Indigenous Peoples in its online publications. This research focused on the second half of Evo Morales' third term in office, when the new role of the indigenous person as a citizenship archetype had already been modestly consolidated. This study focuses on four distinct newspapers, relying on content analysis and framing analysis of articles dealing with and representing Indigenous Peoples as a methodology. The four newspapers were chosen either for their size and importance (*El Deber, La Razón, Página Siete*) or their political affiliation with the State (*Cambio*).

As vehicles of information, the publications analysed convey heavily biased stances, widening the gap between one side and the other in an already deeply divided society like Bolivia's. This polarisation acts as a tool of division, stoking flames of conflict and eroding the fertile middle grounds of dialogue, debate and compromise. Some media still portrays Indigenous Peoples as ossified relics of a pre-Columbian past, relying on binary oppositions between Indigenous and non-Indigenous, others discredit differences under the guise of *mestizaje*, while some focus on Indigenous Peoples' agency to highlight what has been achieved and how their own volition can shape the course of their social, economic, and political path.

Indigenous Peoples' representations in Bolivia are, therefore, quite divergent, even amongst bigger and mainstream outlets, creating their own kind of echo chamber; depending on the media consumed and the sociopolitical predispositions of the readers, two quite divergent portrayals are real and coexist side by side. This very contradiction could be an object of future studies, in an attempt to study what is the role of the media in broadening social divides. This is especially true in a society like Bolivia, where the differences between the "haves" and the "have-nots" are stark and the media is openly and partially biased, enacting a role that is more opinion-based and less informative than the common canons of journalistic objectivity.

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Media, Indigenous Peoples, Bolivia, Frame Analysis, Identity, Decolonisation, Representation

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1 Introduction

The present Master's thesis analyses the online publications of four Bolivian newspapers regarding their representations of Indigenous Peoples in the period between 2016 and 2018. My aim is to assess how the national printed media represents Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia. My methods consist of both qualitative content analysis and frame analysis of media articles, published in the online pages of each respective outlet.

The period analysed coincides with the last term of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales. All the articles analysed stem from his last term in office (2014-2019), with all of them being from 2016, 2017, and 2018.

Three of the four newspapers have been selected according to distribution size, whereas the last one (*Cambio*) was chosen purposefully on the basis of being the official state newspaper, created by Evo Morales in 2009. The data for the thesis consists of 72 news articles retrieved from the online sources of *El Deber*, *La Razón*, *Página Siete* and *Cambio*.

La Razón and *Página Siete* are both based in La Paz, the *de facto* capital of Bolivia, whereas *El Deber* is centred in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, in the eastern lowlands, the country's economic powerhouse. *Cambio*, affiliated with the state, also operates from La Paz.

My goal is to analyse the ways in which these selected media outlets portray Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, by conducting a frame analysis of their online publications regarding Indigenous Peoples. I analysed the occurrence of six distinct frames (**Conflict, Credibility, (Political) Agency, Identity, (De) Colonisation** and **Responsibility**) and their negative or positive dimensions, which in turn illustrate which framing is employed when representing Indigenous Peoples.

I also take into account in my analysis how these differ from socially established views on the Amerindian (Fabian 1983), as being opposed to the Western, the former representing the past, as an apolitical object, and the latter as a symbol of today, a subject of its own modernity, and how these align (or not) with the State's attempt to decolonise Bolivia and guide the discourse on indigeneity. Based on anthropological work done in Latin America until the beginning of the 1990s, many accounts portrayed the Andean communities as "internally coherent", in "a harmonious totality", "isolated from the nation-state, development efforts, and wider

economy", and "apart from external influences" (Ranta 2014), contributing to an "essentialized construction of Andean communities as relics of the Pre-Columbian past" (Lazar 2008: 9, quoted in Ranta 2014: 59); this study looks into whether or not Bolivian media still reproduces such a view, much like some other regional media still does (Browne-Sartori et al. 2010), and which of the outlets still endorse and convey a similar message.

Some of the publications portray a new possibility of identity for Indigenous Bolivians (namely *Cambio*), such as political agency (immensely magnified by Morales' rise to power), the right to be educated and to access services in one's own native language, the legitimacy of indigenous justice, or even to assume social and economic posts and positions which have been traditionally barred to them and kept in the hands of the non-Indigenous minority, like those related to technology, services, education, and, above all, politics and economics, whereas others remain steadfast in promoting a *mestizo* notion of Bolivian identity, diluting historical and structural imbalances between parts of the nation.

Unless otherwise specifically stated, every translation from Spanish to English henceforth is my own and of my own personal responsibility if inaccurate. As a non-Bolivian, non-Indigenous researcher, I accept and fully understand the limitations of my knowledge, be it academically acquired or socially embedded, regarding the entirety of the process of interpretation and consumption of media publications by the different actors involved in Bolivian society, as well as any other shortcomings this limited research might have, be they methodological or interpretative.

2 Historical context and background

In the words of Herbert Klein, whose "A concise history of Bolivia" has become the standard in English for historical recaps of the nation, "Bolivia is, and has been since the sixteenth-century Spanish conquest, a capitalist Western class-organized society in which the Indians were for many centuries an exploited class of workers" (Klein 2011: xii). Like in many other countries on the American continent, race in Bolivia is a term that is markedly social. Traditionally, there have been three more-or-less well defined strata in Bolivian society; the upper, Spanish-speaking, Western-dressed and educated class was understood as the "whites" or *criollos*; the lower and middle classes of the urban sprawls, alongside the European-dressed and Spanish-speaking farmers (who sometimes also spoke one of the many native languages)

were known as *cholos* (the term used in Bolivia for what equates to *mestizo* in other countries of the former Hispanic America realms – and not devoid of a pejorative connotation) and the Amerindian language-speaking peasants, kept away from power and political activity, "except as they abandoned their traditional norms and languages and integrated into the national society as *cholos* or whites" (Klein 2011: xii).

However, the second half of the twentieth century and especially the new millennium have brought many changes to this social framework that had been perpetuated since the colonial times. Starting with the National Revolution of 1952, many reforms were undertaken on social, economic and political levels, diminishing the gap between the two ends of the social strata scope, while at the same time creating a fertile environment for "an alternative means of acculturation to modern society without abandoning Amerindian culture and languages" (Klein 2011: xiii). In the aftermath of these revolutionary changes (which nonetheless had their own shortcomings), the Indigenous populations were granted political agency for the first time, setting up the next half-century of politics in the country, notwithstanding the near two decades of military rule, from 1964 until 1982 (Morales 2004). However, it wasn't until the end of the millennium that the new Indigenous parties and leaders became of great political relevance, on a national scale, with what Herbert Klein calls an "emergence of a Mestizo and Indigenous Elite". As an example, the *Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (Assembly for the Sovereignty of Peoples – ASP) was formed in 1995 and, after internal disagreements, the *Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (Instrument for the Sovereignty of Peoples – IPSP) was founded in 1999 by a group of Morales' supporters. This group later became the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement for Socialism - MAS) to be able to run in national elections (Ranta 2014). Other important civil society groups and organisations, such as CONAMAQ (*Consejo de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu*), were also founded during the late 1990s (Kohl and Farthing 2006).

After the 2002 elections and the outrage that stemmed from the way Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was elected and his support coalition was formed, as well as the outcry that led to the so-called Gas Wars (Ranta 2014), the majority of the traditional parties started being displaced due to the accumulated anger and exhaustion stemming from the neo-liberal political programmes implemented during the two previous decades. PODEMOS (*Poder Democrático Social* – Social Democratic Party, in English), a non-indigenous right-wing party that was, in fact, ADN (*Acción Democrática Nacionalista* – National Democratic Action, in English), the party of former dictator Hugo Banzer, emerged, while MAS and Evo Morales, who came up a

tight second in the aforementioned contest, had become the most important political entity and leader, respectively, in the country. In the 2005 election, MAS and MIP (*Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti* – Pachakuti Indigenous Movement), another significant, though much smaller, Indigenous party, won the contest outright, a quick turnaround in comparison to the 2002 electoral act, building on their 2004 municipal elections breakthrough (Ranta 2014: 21). This result left Bolivia's traditional parties in the wake of both new non-Indigenous organisations and emerging Indigenous parties, led by MAS, whose leader, Evo Morales, was elected the first self-described Indigenous president of the republic, after garnering more than 50% of the total votes (the first president to do so after the military ruling era that ended in 1982), as well as 12 out of 27 senate seats and 72 out of 130 deputy places.

After the 2005 election, the country became divided into two larger political areas; on one hand, the highland departments of La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Potosí, represented by the new indigenous class, while on the other the lowland departments of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija comprised the traditional elite, though this division was rather fluid, both geographically and regarding the intensity of political commitments, with compromises between both of the macro-regions achieved without major, strife-creating problems, at least initially. The five decades since the National Revolution of 1952 - which for the first time granted the right to vote to all adults, irrespective of their literacy levels, at once enfranchising masses of *campesinos*, conducting an agrarian reform, dismantling the *hacienda* properties of the highlands and redistributing them amongst Indigenous workers - have thus seen the republic undergo a massive social and economic change, with notable improvements, such as in health and in education, alongside the continued existence of some deep-rooted problems, like persistent poverty in both rural and urban areas. The access of the whole adult Indigenous populace to the right to vote meant that, though decades went by in search of an independent political voice, governments had to take into account Indigenous Peoples requests and needs.

Nonetheless, the country has gone through what some have called the "*mestizaje* of Bolivian society" (Klein 2011: 285), with the economic power that had traditionally been held by the white populace being diminished, enabling its popular classes by increasing standards of living and improving education, leading to their more significant and independent participation in the political scene of the nation. However, this process was not without flaws, as it led in many situations to the downplaying of indigeneity and rendered mute many of the claims made by Indigenous Peoples, effectively assimilated as *mestizos* under many public policies.

Economically, the continued assimilation of regional economies, spearheaded by the bigger and more appealing cities like the neighbouring La Paz and El Alto, had led to the disappearance of the rural elites that had been in place since the colonial times and, at the same time, to the emergence of a strong *mestizo* elite with regional influence. From this new elite has emerged a vast and powerful group, university-educated professionals and no longer a minority fraction contingent to the traditional "white" dominant norms and patterns, able to self-adhere to identities such as indigenous, *mestizos*, Aymara, Quechua, Chiquitano, whilst speaking Spanish and/or other native languages, sometimes identifying with seemingly contradictory markers, at least in the eyes of the traditional identity-imposing "white" norms. This new *mestizo* class was, alongside various Indigenous groups, the key driving group behind the immense popular mobilisations (though massive public demonstrations were not, by any means, a new phenomenon in Bolivia) that demanded change between the election in 2002 and the rise to power of Evo Morales in the electoral act of December 2005, punctuated by the aforementioned and infamous Water (1999-2000) and Gas (2003) Wars and the resignation of President Sánchez Lozada later that same year. Morales' program saw a major injection of *mestizo* and especially Indigenous political leaders into governmental positions, which was not surprising to any of his political adversaries, but most importantly, at least economically, was the decision to abandon the long-standing tradition of privatisations within the country. Attempting a different approach to guide the national economy,

> "the Morales government has renationalized gas and oil production, taken over all telecommunications, all the electricity companies, even from national cooperatives, proposed the elimination of private pension plans, re-created a state airlines company, nationalized two Swiss smelters, and systematically pushed for state control over mineral resources from iron ore to lithium" (Klein 2011: 288).

Morales' government added amendments to the Agrarian Reform of 1953, especially regarding the lowland estate distribution, untouched by it. Building on the 2002 land reform act, Morales redistributed more than 30 million hectares to more than 150000 farmers and peasants, many of which Indigenous Peoples that had lost their lands to the big properties illegally and corruptly distributed during the military regimes (Klein 2011: 290).

Politically, Morales also signified a stark contrast to previous Bolivian presidents and governments. On the international politics side, the MAS government has moved away from the United States, sometimes even overtly and aggressively, instead focusing on independently building relationships with Indigenous groups, from Northern Europe to Central America,

advocating environmental protection at the international level (while having to deal with its implications nationally[1]) and bringing Bolivia to the global diplomatic spotlight via its own steps. Adding to its long list of dramatic changes, Morales' government pushed intensely for a new constitutional framework, aiming to expand decentralisation and the plurinational aspect of the state, which were the key themes of the MAS party, both before and during the campaign for the 2005 election. Setting the tone for MAS's political project, the 2009 Constitution represented "the culmination of a long process (…) to shape the postcolonial terms of political participations, which has been historically defined by the profound marginalization of its indigenous and popular majority" (Albro 2010: 71), guaranteeing the rights of the Indigenous communities to their forms of government, while bolstering autonomy at the departmental, regional, communal and municipal levels, furthering decentralisation. The document called for the acknowledgment of Indigenous persons as "full citizens", recognising not only the highland Indigenous groups but also the lowland ones and even the comparatively small Afro-Bolivian community. By declaring Bolivia a plurinational state whose status was reflected legally, the new constitution established 37 different Indigenous languages as official alongside Spanish, inculcated the autonomy of its regions and its self-governing bodies, created legal frameworks instilling respect for different individuals, communities, codes of etiquettes and belief systems, reaffirming the interculturality of its social fabric by renaming itself thenceforth *Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia*. Perhaps most importantly to the topic, it also stated that the state itself was responsible for guaranteeing the communal land rights of the Indigenous communities, their traditional worldviews, medicine practices, rituals, symbols and even their traditional garments, while at the same time enabling Indigenous groups to "exercise their own unique political, judicial, and economic systems as defined by their own cosmology" (Klein 2011: 292). Furthermore, it even contained provisions for Indigenous communities known as *pueblos originarios* to "declare themselves self-governing entities independent of municipal or departmental governments with self-governing rights that were equal to those granted to these institutions" (ibid: 292), while at the same time acquiesced to demands from isolated groups wishing to remain so.

Notwithstanding the tremendous work done at the domestic level, the political project of the *Movimiento al Socialismo* was fortunate to have impeccable timing. Morales' ascent to power was coupled with support from sympathetic regional governments in South America, such as

[1] Lalander, Rickard. 2017. Ethnic rights and the dilemma of extractive development in plurinational Bolivia. *The International Journal of Human Rights 21* (4): 464-481 is a good starting point.

those in Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador, amongst others of the so called "pink tide" that reached its peak during Evo's second term in office. At the same time, US interventions in Latin America had dwindled down due to their investment in Middle Eastern affairs, and steady international demand for hydrocarbons kept government revenues high and constant. Nonetheless, there have been some less than desirable consequences relating to this immense shift in the Bolivian socio-political landscape; constant national political tension, an intermittent lack of willingness to dialogue and negotiate with the opposition and occasional undermining of adversary political figures have shown hints of a certain authoritarianism by MAS, most recently illustrated by the decision to ignore the referendum of February 2018, which negated by popular vote the right to stand for indefinite re-election.

The remarkable and intense change that has happened during the last two decades has set the stage for the MAS' attempt to decolonise the state, in ways that go far beyond the economic and political stage. Many seem to think that "the new plurinational state is the culmination of centuries of struggle over the status of Bolivia's native peoples" (Postero 2013: 107), with indigeneity as a central concept for re-imagining the nation and Indigenous persons as the archetypical citizen of a new country.

3 Media in Bolivia

Media throughout Latin America is typically characterised by a "high level of market concentration, resulting in the representation of a narrow set of perspectives" (Lupien 2013 :226), with social and political movements built around defying the supremacy of social elites often described as "dangerous and reckless" (ibid.). In the case of Bolivia, media is highly concentrated, with both television networks and newspaper outlets being controlled and owned by a handful of actors, with long-term associations to the more established and long-standing political parties. While this is particularly true when it comes to television (ATB, Bolivisión, Red Uno, Unitel and PAT have more than two-thirds of market share), it is equally notable regarding the print media. *El Deber*, *La Razón, La Prensa,* and *El Diario* take home slightly less than two-thirds of the national circulation. Although *La Prensa* and *El Diario* are not part of this analysis, their inclusion in future studies could be of relevance, given their importance in the national media landscape. In a sense, media ownership in Bolivia "resembles that of the rest of the economic sectors", as there are "very close ties between the business elites and the traditional political system" (Quintanilla 2014: 182), with sometimes not-so-vested interests

seeping through the media content brought to the public. *El Deber* is owned by the Rivero family (which also has ties to *La Prensa*), historically connected to Bolivia's three traditional parties (*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario - MNR*, *Acción Democrática Nacionalista – ADN,* and *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria - MIR*), while *La Razón* is owned by the Grupo PRISA, a Spanish media conglomerate which also owns *El País*, Spain's second most circulated daily newspaper. *El País* has historical ties with the PSOE, the Spanish Socialist Party, and is often described politically as a centrist newspaper, with a certain leaning towards the left side of the political spectrum.

More so than the market shares garnered by each of the media outlets, the relationship between them and the current government is of the utmost significance. Nowadays, the political situation in Bolivia is so polarised that "the media are considered not just as an adversary but as an (sic) straightforward enemy" of the government (Quintanilla 2014: 178). To understand why this is so, a look back to the historical context on Bolivian democracy, media ownership structure and the state media relations before Evo Morales' administration sheds some light. The three aforementioned parties (*MNR*, *AND, MIR*) had since the 1960s perpetuated "a lack of representation and engendered corruption", and with constant pandering to "corporate interests, and even those personal and small group interests", in turn favouring "patrimonial, privileged, nepotistic and clientelist practices" (Villanueva 2007, as cited in Quintanilla 2014: 178), where at the same time there was a certain media empowerment. At first, the media became "spaces of political display", as it "brought the facts and actors of politics to the citizens regularly, not only during electoral periods" (Quintanilla 2014: 180). Secondly, the media became more and more participative in political activity, "intervening explicitly in orienting public decisions, in conflict management and in promoting or disqualifying actors" (Villanueva, as cited in Quintanilla 2014: 180). Lastly, the media assumed "not only a watchdog role over politics, but in fact an active role determined by direct continuous exchange with politicians and policy-makers", becoming a key player in national politics (ibid). As an example, Boas cites the news coverage of Evo Morales' second election campaign in 2009, which was "overwhelmingly biased against him", as "only 1% of his coverage was positive, and only 2% of that devoted to his major opponent, Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga, was negative" (Boas 2012: 26). In a sense, and as Quintanilla puts it,

> "(…) media and Bolivian journalists see themselves as a Fourth Power. For most journalists it is unthinkable to refrain from giving their own opinions and stick only to reporting on the debate among the

> political and social actors. One of the consequences of these practices, according to the author [Peñaranda], has been the substitution of informational genres for journalists' opinions. (Quintanilla 2014: 183)

This situation of the media being seen as "a 'political battlefield' where journalists and social movements are the new actors" (Quintanilla 2014: 180) is something which has arisen only since the beginning of the new millennium. According to Quintanilla (2014) and Sáinz (2010), it was only after the Indigenous conflicts in the early 2000s "that the big media networks began to include the stories of these social movements in their news agendas" (Quintanilla 2014: 180), up until now almost completely neglected and unreported. Due to its central role in Bolivian politics, an unprepared media "lacked any true capacity of anticipation, preparation, and commitment to democracy and ended up acting at times reactively and, in other cases, with sensationalism" (Quintanilla 2014: 181), contributing to the polarised and explosive media context of Bolivia today.

This schism, however, was not only caused by a self-entitled media; Evo Morales did his best to challenge the *status quo* and with it brought on a "quick polarization between the new government, supported by social and indigenous movements, and middle and upper classes that had benefited from the existing establishment" (Quintanilla 2014: 181). This led to the aforementioned regional divide in the country, as most of these middle and upper classes were and are concentrated in the so-called *Media Luna*, the eastern, lowland departments which constitute the industrial and economic powerhouse of Bolivia, with Santa Cruz leading the way. This divide created an idea that the claims made by Morales' government were a "popular insurrection" and that "indigenous groups' uprising in search for a historical vindication against traditional political and economic elites" were the reason behind them (Quintanilla 2014: 181-182), delegitimising both Evo's political agenda *and* grassroots and Indigenous movements.

Morales and his government clashed with the media from the outset, as Evo viewed most of the media as trying "to protect the interests of groups linked to traditional political parties" (Quintanilla 2014: 185). This polarity is, according to Quintanilla, "rooted in unsolved ethnic, regional, and class divisions in Bolivia" (ibid: 186). By bringing ethnicity and class to the clash, Morales made "private media appear as vehicles of racist groups who yearn for past domination" (ibid: 192), a criticism perhaps not totally unwarranted. This clash between the media and Morales stems from the way in which the latter has "reconfigured the media scenario by creating or strengthening a network of state-funded media, defined by a clear promotional and propagandist editorial line", which the executive justifies by claiming that "private media

are negatively biased against the government" (Quintanilla 2014: 190). The creation of *Cambio,* one of the newspapers analysed in this thesis, is an example of this attempt by the State to publish its own discourse and level the playing field.

In sum, Quintanilla labels the Bolivian media as a "a captured liberal system", though "more extreme than other cases in the region", with the interaction between politics and the media "defined by the constant interference of political and economic interests on the watchdog role of the media" (Quintanilla 2014: 186). On the governmental side, there has been an effort to align media with the new political conjuncture more so than to dismantle private media *per se*. This, however, has turned most commercial media into "partisan supporters of the opposition, and populist presidents have abandoned any public service pretensions with state media, dragging them into the fray as well" (Boas 2012: 29-30), of which *Cambio*'s coverage is a clear example.

Some newspapers have let their political affiliations and stances clear through their publications. *El Deber,* for example, has used "frames and labels that portray "ethnic" peoples (generally identified as Morales supporters) as irrational and unreasonable for demanding special "cultural rights" over "equality before the law", as well as falsely associating "indigenous or community justice with lynchings and barbaric practices" (Lupien 2013: 236-237). *La Razón* has followed similar tactics, claiming Indigenous justice would lead to "social chaos and the destruction of the state", and that Evo Morales' government "was planning to apply indigenous justice to nonindigenous people or extend these practices to the major cities" and "against citizens" (Lupien 2013: 237), claims which were not only unsubstantiated but also against the stipulations of the plurinational constitution. In all, the media portrayal of those supportive of the Morales government, which, inevitably, includes vast scores of Indigenous Peoples, has been less than unbiased and impartial, but neither has the content produced by the State, which casts its own inflammatory doubts over the opposition along ethnic and racial lines for its own political purposes.

4 Previous Research on Representations, Othering, and Representation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia

4.1 Representations

Representation is by excellence the field within which much of the colonialist and post-colonial interactions occur, as well as a major driving force behind the establishing of a colonial paradigm, perhaps to the point of being comparable, in its reaches and effect, to the conquests in themselves (Ashcroft et al. 2003). The role of writers, novelists, anthropologists, historians and the rest of the text-producing agents of the colonising powers was one based on framing the "Other" into "European frameworks which read his or her alterity as *terror* or *lack*" (ibid: 85). Not only were these ideas of a starkly different and inferior "Other" spread amongst the psyche of those back at the metropoles but they too were projected on those colonised "Others", perpetuated via media, literature, education and the socio-cultural norms of the colonialist society, therefore establishing the acceptable boundaries of what the colonised could understand as their own image, enduring even after independence.

As a perfect example of identity building via the process of Othering, these texts acted as representations of the colonial subject that posited the coloniser as the norm and the standard, as a superior one, based not on any "accounts of different peoples and societies, but a projection of European fears and desires masquerading as scientific/'objective' knowledges" (Ashcroft et al. 2003: 85). Said's work (1989) is perhaps one of the bases for the postcolonial understanding of representation, and it is of importance when considering the identity creation of *criollos* in Bolivia. It is by using, controlling and producing the methods of spreading and disseminating information that the colonial representations still endure long after the *de jure* colonising has ended, where it has indeed ended.

4.2 Othering

The concept of Othering is one that goes hand in hand with identity, both historically and as co-creators of complementary meanings. Stemming from the heart of post-colonial theory, the

concept of Othering tries to explain how identities are located "within specific social contexts and conditioned by them" (Jensen 2011: 63). Spivak introduces the concept and illustrates the ways in which the self composes its own identity in opposition to the Other, how this process is "producing an "other" text – the true history" (Spivak 1985: 257), rendering all others as marginal and, therefore, illegitimate. Hall takes it a step further and theorises that "the notion that identity has to do with people that look the same, feel the same, call themselves the same, is nonsense", for identity, "as a process, as a narrative, as a discourse, it is always from the position of the Other" (Hall 1991: 49). The process of identity-making is then understood as one fundamentally attached to representing and perceiving the self as opposed to some Other. Howarth posits that "identities are continually developed and contested through others' representations of our claimed social groups" (Howarth 2002: 159) and Dervin understands Othering as a form of social representation, of objectifying a person, thus putting aside and ignoring "the complexity and subjectivity of the individual" (Dervin 2012: 187), essentialising and enacting "Othering by imposing cultural elements as explanations for people's behaviours, encounters, opinions" (ibid), with the end result of protecting and reinforcing the Self in contrast with the Other, something that Dervin, like Hall, understands as impossible not to do.

In relation to colonial and postcolonial studies in particularly, Othering describes "the various ways in which colonial discourse produces its subjects", a "dialectical process because the colonizing *Other* is established at the same time as its colonized *others* are produced as subjects" (Ashcroft et al 2007: 156). The process lumps together people "into a collective 'they'" (Pratt 1985: 139), confirming the reality of those that are in a position of power by "delineating that opposition that must exist" so that the "empire can define itself against those it colonizes, excludes and marginalizes", positioning" its 'others' by this process in the pursuit of that power within which its own subjectivity is established (Ashcroft et al. 2007: 158), in a co-creating process of identity affecting both sides.

4.3 Representation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia

While there is almost no previous research regarding representation of Indigenous Peoples in national newspapers specifically, there is plenty of research on how they have been portrayed at large, whether politically (and by the State) or socially. Indigenous groups in Bolivia have been represented since the colonial times under many different lights, most of them not so endearing, be it in public discourse, governmental agendas and in socially acceptable habits,

practices and normalised abusive settings. Some terms and images have persisted throughout time, such as *chola* and *cholo* (the former meaning, somewhat positively, a *mestizo* woman who is "hard-working, humble, gentle, passionate and willing to sacrifice" (Droguett 2013: 383), with the latter being an equivalent to the usage of *indio*, a derogatory term to refer to an Indigenous male), still very much in use in La Paz and the *altiplano*. Throughout the centuries, there has been what Field calls a "considerable mutual internalization of the cultural characteristics" of both Hispanic and Indigenous Bolivians, leading to Indigenous Peoples using "the very institutions and doctrines that the colonizers imposed to erase the past and destroy resistance" to survive and resist, so much so that "modern day 'indigenous ethnic groups' and 'indigenous cosmologies' are unintelligible apart from their struggle with the state" (Field 1994: 244-245).

Another key actor in the representation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia is the State itself and it has been so throughout the centuries. As the terms *indígena* and *mestizo* are "a sociopolitical decision, the result of sociopolitical practice" (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994: 107), the role of the State in shaping discourse is decisive; if on one hand, "a white Bolivian would attempt to ward off discrimination claims by claiming that "we Bolivians are all mestizos"", Indigenous people would employ "the same term in order to *prevent* said discrimination from taking place" (ibid: 107)[2]. The first State to (politically) enfranchise Indigenous Peoples was the one established after the 1952 National Revolution, though its stance regarding Indigenous Peoples followed an equally damaging pattern to those enacted before; the State "grew around the notion of a glorified creole-mestizo class", turning it into "substance of the nation" (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994:107), thereby disarming Indigenous Peoples' specific needs and demands. As previously alluded to, Indigenous peoples were rebranded *campesinos* (peasants, in Spanish) and, as Ströbele-Gregor puts it, "a *criollo* elite, self-imagined as white (in the socio-political sense), perpetuated its own benefits and privileges, culturally, politically, economically and socially, while at the same time undertaking the "burden" of "assimilating the Indians, eliminating their autonomous cultures and living patterns" (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994: 108), implementing the

[2] Xavier Albó states that "in Bolivia both terms [*campesino* and *indígena*] are equally applicable in the countryside – the overwhelming majority of the rural population is indigenous, in terms of its identity and ethnic and cultural origins, and at the same time campesino, because of its means of subsistence or social class. In addition, following the 1952 Revolution both public and popular discourses were permeated by a pseudo-modernising tendency which restricted the use of the term 'indigenous' to describe only the most isolated groups, in particular ethnic minorities in the lowlands. The rest of the indigenous population was referred to only as 'campesino'. However, with the resurgence of ethnic pluralism and legislation more favourable to indigenous people throughout the world, this trend is currently in decline." (Albó, Xavier. 2002. "Bolivia: From Indian and Campesino Leaders to Councillors and Parliamentary Deputies." In *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous rights, diversity, and democracy,* edited by Rachel Sieder, 74-102. New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Western-inspired ideas of civilisation, progress and modernisation, requiring they "renounce" their "Indianness".

By the late 1970s, though, the ideological tenets of the 1952 revolution were wearing thin (hindered immensely by the devastating acts and consequences of the dictatorial regimes from the post 1964 era, some, namely that of Hugo Banzer, politically supported by the MNR) and the emergence of "ethnic discourses and autonomous movements" (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994: 109) became a reality in the second half of the 1980s. However, the Indian peasant movements and the Indianist (mostly urban) organisations did not share, at the beginning of the 1990s, an ideological core; instead, these movements were linked by "an ethnic interpretation of social reality in which the dominant criollos are defined as whites but with widely varying self-definitions" (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994:113-114), which made unified political relevancy and action considerably more difficult. One particularly stark difference is the way in which different Indigenous Peoples have dealt and coexisted historically with the *criollo* society (and between themselves); highland Aymara and Quechua-speaking Peoples have developed "a historical consciousness", a "reawakened pride in their cultural origin", which create an "idealization of Andean culture and ethnocentrism", rejected by lowland Indigenous Peoples, seen by highlanders, in a cruelly ironic way, as "less civilized and backward" (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994: 114), and mattering very little in the public and political discourses and spheres. This has been pointed out by many authors in regards to public policies and especially in relation to the 2009 constitution, both of which have been criticised as being Aymara or highland-centric.

Other authors, like José Lucero, have similarly expounded how Indigenous Peoples in Latin America have been portrayed and how their "realness" as "Indians" has been represented and questioned. Since the Western-imposed view of the Native American is one of purity, different groups of Indigenous Peoples are often "Othered" under a different light, i.e., given authority by Westerners. On the one hand, Indigenous Peoples from the Andes are seen as "less "pure" and "authentic" than their Amazonian counterparts" (Lucero 2006: 35), for they have engaged in attempts to dismantle and re-appropriate Western languages and strategies, having thus become "westernised". Since the Westerner perception of Indigenous Peoples already has a model deeply enrooted in racist and colonial ideas which don't accommodate agency and are frozen in time, this "confines native people to limited cultural and political worlds whose boundaries are set by outside observers" (ibid: 35). In many ways, this happens not only socially but also politically; the "official notions of what constitutes Bolivian national heritage has a

Eurocentric bias" and it "stems from racialised notions of cultural heritage inherited from the colonial period" (Oviedo 2014: 59). This notion leads to an essentialised idea of Bolivian, and therefore Indigenous, identity as one of *mestizaje*, which the 1952 revolution exacerbated. This alleged move towards "hybridity" involves not an evenly matched syncretism but rather presupposes, and requires, "distancing oneself from the Indian social condition and thus de-Indianising" (de la Cadena 2000: 316, quoted in Oviedo 2014: 65). Oviedo uses the Carnival of Oruro as an example to illustrate how "sanitised, non-subversive and simplified images of the *indio permitido*" (a *mestizaje*–embracing one) survive today, without the need (or will) to "convey the legacy of discrimination, theft and extermination suffered by indigenous peoples" (Oviedo 2014: 65-66), diluted in this construct of indigeneity. Much in the same way, Bolivian printed media, with the exception of *Cambio*, controlled by Evo Morales' government, perpetuates a similar idea.

In sum, the State as an agent of representation of Indigenous Peoples has moved from casting them as backwards and un-developed in the pre-1952 National Revolution era, to trying to dilute their identity and agency under the guise of *mestizaje* after 1952, to almost completely monopolising the discourse on indigeneity and Indigenous Peoples through a highlands-inspired perspective in the Evo Morales era. Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia have historically been marginally kept aside since the state's foundation as an independent nation; its official history presents a country "constituted only by whites" (Gruner 2003: 182). However, it was not only the State that preserved such a stance, with the media having played its own part in perpetuating discrimination and negative stereotypes, acting as the State's mouthpiece in its systemic erasing of Indigenous Peoples from nationhood. It is important, however, to distinguish between the different types of media and their reach and impact on the public discourse; radio is by far the most widely available and far-reaching media in Bolivia, as well as the one with the broadest history, especially in regards to Indigenous media, whereas television (and other visual means of representation) has steadily gained space in the public Bolivian eye only in the last few decades. Printed media, on the other hand, is still a distant third when it comes to current ubiquity and importance in the national landscape. It was chosen, though, as it is a rapidly growing media, with eight major newspapers having been founded since 2006, including two of the four publications analysed for this thesis in the state-owned *Cambio* and the increasingly important *Página Siete*.

In regards to printed media and its historical part, its role in deciding who was included and excluded in the newly independent Bolivia was evident; the press held the same ideological

beliefs behind the *Criollo* national project being implemented, contrasting "barbarian" languages, dialects and peoples with the "Enlightenment" path chosen by an elitist nation-state (Unzueta 2000: 42). The patent heterogeneity of the Bolivian ethnic, linguistic and cultural fabric was portrayed as an obstacle to the "progress" of the nation, whereas acting towards diluting differences and homogenising the country was lauded and indorsed, reflecting an assimilationist tendency which promoted a notion of bringing civilisation to the "barbarian" Indians (Unzueta 2000: 44). Consequently, Indigenous Peoples were cast as being second-degree parts of the nation, socially and legally below the Europeanised idea of Bolivian nationhood and its members, "denying or marginalising their possible contribution to the cultural programs of the fatherland" (Unzueta 2000: 45). The printed media served from the foundation of the country as the only medium guiding public opinion, with a dearth of book publishers or higher education centres, resulting in a vacuum of other counter-acting voices and setting an ominous tone for the many decades to follow.[3]

These formative years were quite important in setting the stage for the subdued and repressed status of Indigenous Peoples in the country (adding to the effect many centuries of colonial rule already had had), having through endless propaganda and silent, deliberate negligence of their plight achieved a "humbled abasement" (Montenegro 2016: 235) from the popular classes. This representation (or lack thereof) was so heavily slanted during the first few decades of the Bolivian Republic that the first positive mentions of Indigenous Peoples' predicament only appears during the presidency of Manuel Isidoro Belzu, between the years of 1848 and 1855 (ibid). Those drafting and writing the texts published by the first newspapers were often times men of the highest political strata, with many of them having served in high-ranking political roles, namely the presidency of the nation (Unzueta 2000), a situation which has not changed completely.[4]

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[3]As an example, Indigenous Peoples have been blamed for the lack of economic developed of Bolivia since the post-independence era of the first half of the nineteenth century, and their rejection of certain agricultural reforms was deemed "precivilised, ignorant and barbaric", stigmas which remained assigned along ethnic lines (Irurozqui 2008: 88)

[4] Carlos Mesa, for example, who served as President of Bolivia from 2003 to 2005, after the resignation of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, under whom he had served as Vice-President, was the author of some of the articles analysed for this thesis.

Throughout its turbulent history, though, the representation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia has undergone profound changes, greatly owing to Indigenous resistance and pushback in the fight for the right and access to means of self-representation, especially after the 1940s and 1950s.[5] Starting from the 1952 revolution, Indigenous groups started converging and organising to this effect, gravitating around the idea of re-appropriating cultural representations as elements of political resistance. As previously mentioned, the radio was the preferred medium to propagate their message due to its low-cost maintenance, easy usage, and far-reaching waves, capable of spreading beyond other means, and accessible to most of the population.

Even though the miner-run radios (since the '40s and '50s) and the mostly catechism-spreading Christian broadcasters (in the '60s) had already been hitting the waves for decades, these means of alternative and communitarian communication (and representation) only started to be employed by Indigenous and *campesino* groups from the '70s and '80s onwards (Martín 2018).

Radioemisora Bolivia, as an example, was founded in Oruro in 1971, kickstarting the nation's Indigenous communication movement (Martín 2018: 24), though still not completely run and managed by Indigenous Peoples. Although some other radio stations already started broadcasting in Quechua and Aymara in the 1960s (Ros Izquierdo 2004), it would be almost two decades before the first "totally Indigenous" (Martín 2018: 25) radio was founded, with *Radio Mallku Kirkiya* being established in Potosí, in 1990, broadcasting during the weekends. In the meantime, the spread of communitarian Indigenous and *campesino* radios ever since the establishing of *Radioemisora Bolivia* led to the creation of regional and national associations, like the *Asociación de Radios Indígenas Aymaras en La Paz*, in 1988, the *Red Amazónica* (covering the Chaco and the Amazon areas), in 1994, and the national-level *Asociación Provincial de Radios Comunitarias de Bolivia*, established in 1996. These conglomerates of locally-run radio broadcasters established a network of communication between different Indigenous groups and Peoples, creating awareness in regards to the power of communication and media in strengthening identities and serving as a means of political resistance (Martín 2018: 27).

[5] It is always important to highlight the disparity existing between different Indigenous groups; whereas some have had greater success in the struggle to find and cast their own voice, like the Aymara and, to a lesser extent, the Quechua, some others, like the Guaraní and many of the less numerically significant Indigenous groups, especially from the lowlands, still haven't managed to break through (see Ros Izquierdo 2004).

At the same time, especially during the late ‘80s and throughout the ‘90s, this movement kickstarted by communitarian radios led to breakthroughs in the audio-visual field of self-representation, following a nation-wide trend that even permeated national television. The *Coordinadora Audiovisual Indígena de Bolivia* was formed in 1996, following a structure and model resembling the *ayllu* and the “logic of communal life of the Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia” (Martín 2018: 32), with the *Sistema Plurinacional de Comunicación* (previously named *Sistema Nacional de Comunicación Indígena Originario Campesino Intercultural*) being founded in the same year. These organisations, both regionally and nationally, have brought and still bring forth the interests and perspectives of the many Indigenous groups and Peoples of Bolivia, highlighting their role (or desired role) in the national scene and political landscape, creating not only a way to reach the mainstream strata of media in the country but also a medium to increase communication between all levels of Bolivian society, especially between Indigenous Peoples, intercultural, and Afro-Bolivian communities.

Meanwhile, a parallel movement was emerging in the greater realm of cinema, with Indigenous Peoples fighting back to regain their own iconography, to stop and curb “the justification of integration, impoverishing and homogenisation policies imposed on [Indigenous] Peoples and the diversity of their identities” (Rodríguez 2007: 107). The *Carta Abierta de Cochabamba*, in 1996, was a formal starting point in combating ossified and frozen representations of Indigenous Peoples in cinema, both in Latin America and outside of it, which still are the norm in many mainstream cinematic productions. In Bolivia in particular, the work of Jorge Sanjinés stands out, with the director’s *Ukamau* (1966) and *La Nación Clandestina* (1989) being some of the most relevant national works exploring the invisible and second-grade role of Indigenous groups and Peoples in Bolivia’s nationhood. It was also under Sanjinés’ guidance that the *Grupo Ukamau* was founded in 1960, creating a solid foundation for the creation of films and movies aiming to portray the realities and lives of the marginalised Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia, giving self-representation a central role in the process of decolonisation (Rodríguez 2007).

On the television medium, the story of Indigenous Peoples’ representation in Bolivia had also been one of slow progresses and episodic successes until the last few decades. The most notable example of an Indigenous-friendly television setting was that established by Carlos Palenque, in 1980. Palenque established *Radio Metropolitana* at first, creating the radio station in 1980 and its landmark program *Tribuna Libre del Pueblo* shortly thereafter, before acquiring the rights to *Canal 4* in 1985 and bringing the show to television. This program “invited participants

from the Aymara communities of La Paz and El Alto (…) [to] talk candidly about their daily needs and problems", making it a "milestone in the history of indigenous representation in Bolivian private media" (Garcia 2018: 94), up until then overtly and biasedly negative towards Indigenous Peoples, used and employed at will to serve their own political and economic agendas. It created a platform for Indigenous Peoples to discuss their problems and air their grievances, with personal testimonies and first-hand accounts (Himpele 2002). By doing so, Palenque "instilled a sense of social, class, and political consciousness among the local indigenous population" (Garcia 2018: 97) and created a new political space for *paceño* Aymara. Before the emergence of the current state-run media under Evo Morales, Palenque's show and his political party, CONDEPA, were the first and almost only highly visible medium that was truly indigenous-friendly, in sharp contrast with the rest of the private television landscape of the country, almost exclusively owned by Santa Cruz-based outlets.

In sum, the representations of Indigenous People in Bolivia have until recently been mostly negative and overtly partial, in part due to the lack of access and ownership of media-producing means by Indigenous Peoples, unable to create their own discourse and representation themselves. There has been a steady increase in awareness regarding the role, needs and rights of Indigenous Peoples and their represented image in the media, owing to a more favourable political climate (starting, somewhat perniciously, with the 1952 Revolution and peaking with Evo Morales' rise to power), better and more access to means of producing media by Indigenous Peoples and their organisations and a general trend towards bringing the Indigenous slice of Bolivia into the national fore, with true political enfranchisement leading this wave.

Even though there is a generally more pro-Indigenous stance in big outlets of the printed media in Bolivia (though only in some), there is still a glaring shortage of Indigenous-held and led media which matches the number, relevance and weight of Indigenous Bolivians, both in number of publications, circulation, and recognition. However, even when media is produced by Indigenous Peoples, the representations conveyed are still heavily influenced both by Bolivia's past history and the (Western) dynamics and logics of media circulation and consumption. In a sense, they are also structured "by the expectations and meanings that indigenous and non-indigenous audiences invest in these images" (Villarreal 2014: 78). There is still a shortage of what Himpele calls "new representations", which "validate and perform indigenous ways of knowing" (Himpele 2004: 356), long subdued under the official *mestizo* history. To Gabriela Villarreal, Indigenous media makers are "constantly caught between portraying realistic, though problematic and contradictory, aspects of life in their communities

and employing a visual repertoire characterised by what some anthropologists have termed 'Indigenism' or an 'American Orientalism'" (Villarreal 2014: 82), in a seemingly paradoxical attempt to subvert, yet doing so in a not-so-blatant, overt manner. In a sense, they "fight against – while sometimes unintentionally reproducing – the imagery and practices of display that commodify, exoticise or spectacularise indigeneity" (ibid: 91). It is in this precariously negotiated position that Indigenous and pro-Indigenous image and media makers locate themselves, with a constant back-and-forth between politicising indigeneity, as Morales did (which *Cambio* clearly reflects), yet attempting to stop short of essentializing Indigenous Peoples and turning them into totemic representations.

5 Theoretical Concepts

5.1 Decolonisation

Decolonisation can be conventionally understood as the end of "the political control, physical occupation, and domination of people over another people and their land for purposes of extraction and settlement to benefit the occupiers" (Crawford 2002: 131; quoted in Ranta 2014: 56). The remnants of a subservient past are still to be seen in the very fabric of society, though, at levels of "unequal class relations and racial discrimination against indigenous peoples and other ethnic minority groups" (Ranta 2014: 56). In a sense, the rearranged Latin American geographies have been built under the same theoretical framework, with a "basis of knowledge and epistemologies of European origin, thereby producing and reproducing hierarchical colonial relations with Latin American societies" (ibid: 55), stifling effective and epistemological independencies.

As presented by Ranta (2014), two main challenges face attempts to decolonise, tightly knit together; on one hand, the fabric of the global economic ties (and its neoliberal engine), and on the other hand the ever-forward ploughing of what she calls the "modern project". This process (to decolonise) lays its foundations on the hope of "constructing alternative knowledge and epistemologies" (Ranta 2014: 57), distinguishing itself from the postcolonial line of thought that has emerged outside of Latin America, strengthening its argument by claiming that Western postcolonial ideas don't contextualise Latin American idiosyncrasies, representing another forced intellectual imposition from the old spheres and locales of power. Although the Bolivian State has remained adamant in its pursuit of decolonisation, the definition it provides for it as

well as the means through which it intends to achieve it have remained, perhaps for political reasons, ever so ambiguous and vague, losing vigour with time. At the same time, many different intellectuals, both Bolivian and foreign, Indigenous and not, have provided their own understandings of the concept in general and applied to the Bolivian context in particular. The State has taken on a patron-like role in promoting certain definitions of the term, though it has not monopolised the discussions entirely, even in certain publications from its own ministries.

The Bolivian sociologist Patricia Chávez posits decolonisation through the lens of interculturality and highlights two basic schools of thought amongst Bolivia's political and intellectual strata; on the one hand, there is a radical alternative which endorses the "construction of a social coexistence not necessarily mediated by the existence or the reinforcement of the state" (Chávez 2011: 16), while on the other hand some are proponents of tackling decolonisation from within the State and its institutional features, albeit from a critical viewpoint and opposing some of its divisive and unjust traits, such as monoculturalism (Chávez 2011). How then, can decolonisation be seen from an interculturality point of view? Chávez argues that interculturality is a critique of the ingrained conception of a culture as superior to another, presenting itself as an idealised version or goal for other cultures to aim towards and to achieve. In this sense, interculturality can be a tool of decolonisation, accepting diversity and a pluriversity of ideas and paradigms, drawing on Walter Mignolo's concept of the de-colonial paradigm, not as one replacing others but as one "affirming pluriversality as a universal project" (Mignolo 2006, quoted in Chávez 2011: 28*)*. For her, then, "decolonising in intercultural terms would imply considering that there is no longer a centre which positions itself as the measuring stick to other cultures" (Chávez 2011: 29-30).

She argues that

> "using indigenous mythology and a discourse of recovering its culture to create a timeless image of itself would be another way of reproducing a colonial outlook. Under certain conditions, therefore, the use of mythology and of ideological mobilisation can also play a neocoloniser role and be an obstacle of decolonisation"[6] (Chávez 2011: 17).

[6] In the original - *"Al usar la mitología indígena y el discurso de recuperación de su cultura para crear una imagen intemporal de la misma, sería otra forma de reproducción de una mirada colonial. En determinadas condiciones, por tanto, el recurso a la mitología y a la movilización ideológica puede también jugar un papel neocolonizador y ser un obstáculo a la descolonización".*

Some authors, like Pedro Portugal, historian and journalist[7], advocate the first of the aforementioned routes to achieve decolonisation, by rejecting the frames of the colonial domination altogether, attempting to decolonise the very notion of decolonisation, which he maintains is a construct of the colonial, Western mind, which sees alterity and otherness as a mechanism of discovering itself, and can lead to a new discourse of subordination (Portugal 2011). This is precisely what Morales and his government are very often accused of, namely by those in the so-called *Media Luna* and by intellectuals adhering to this thesis. However, Portugal does not completely oppose such a use of identity as a key aspect of decolonisation, stating that stoking identity feelings would "only be an initial phase of the liberation process"[8] (Portugal 2011: 89), after which decolonisation must be sought by enacting concrete acts towards the challenge of self-governance. His biggest critique is directed towards the postcolonial discourse in Bolivia, where some posit its "legacy as trying to maintain and petrify that type of discourse, considering it [what he calls "identity exacerbation"] not a step along a decolonising sequence, but decolonisation itself" (ibid). From a more practical point of view, Pedro Portugal defines decolonisation as "the process through which Peoples who were dispossessed of self-governance by a foreign invasion recover their self-determination", as "a basic process of liberation and autonomy" and with "independence as an inevitable consequence" (Portugal 2011: 66).

In essence and in practicality, it would amount to the "liberation and reconstitution of Incaic civilisation" (Chávez 2011: 20) at the time of the Spanish conquest, started in 1532. This process of decolonisation implies many things; on the one hand, the structure and consolidation of its [the Indigenous Peoples'] "own race and culture", rejecting Western or European culture, ideas and materiality as "antagonists of the project of an Incaic society rebuilding" (ibid), is a fundamental part of the course to follow. This refusal to incorporate these mental and ontological frameworks would extend to the *criollo* society, on the basis of its structure having been erected upon "the disintegration of Indigenous Peoples" and that Indigenous Peoples could "not incorporate their aspirations of themselves for its [the *criollo* society's] very illegitimate existence would be the condition of the inexistence of the Indigenous nation"(ibid); in a way, accepting the validity of one would negate the other.

[7] Pedro Portugal Mollinedo is, coincidentally, author of some of the articles analysed for this thesis, written in *Página Siete*, and the editor of *Pukara*, a publication dedicated to Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia.

On the other hand, the second part of understanding what decolonisation entails is perhaps even more complex; the question brought forth relates to how and under which structure would this new Incaic nation be organised and devised. Portugal does not necessarily refuse the structuring of this emergent entity through and around the idea of the nation-state, itself profoundly European and embedded with colonial ideas, arguing that "decolonisation must be contemporaneous" (Portugal 2011: 93), that is, "handling current conditions", in a sense of understanding and mediating this process of change through the existing power structures and the fabric of the existing society today. One could argue that an outright rejection of the *criollo* society which has emerged since the colonial era, albeit accurately denounced as having risen on the back of and by the disappearance of the Indigenous Peoples' one, would be difficult to understand as "contemporaneous", as he himself defines it. Patricia Chávez, on the other hand, highlights the apparent contradiction of this stance, mentioning that there were indeed these very same power structures and control mechanisms which enabled the perpetuation of inequality. Her fundamental question is then, in an attempt to manoeuvre around this problem, how one can "accommodate both the current power with those given to Indigenous communities" (Chávez 2011: 22) and if they are even compatible.

Some authors, however, offer different understandings of decolonisation and what it means. Although decolonisation is also "the overcoming of colonial elements that deny Indigenous Peoples' social organisation forms" (Chávez 2011: 24), Roberto Choque, for instance, does not regard the nation-state and Indigenous Peoples' as necessarily antagonistic, because both actors can, under the current socio-political context, take the discourse of decolonisation from theory to practice, enshrining it legally and constitutionally. Decolonisation then, according to Roberto Choque, should be a process whose aim is to recover the history, identity, self-esteem and ancestral values of the Indigenous Peoples, as well as their cosmovision and spiritual understandings (Choque 2011: 56). Decolonisation, thus, should focus on revaluing "the ancestral knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and Nations, intercultural and Afro-Bolivian communities" and eliminating "practices based on feudal, patrimonial, patriarchal, racist and bureaucratic" principles (Choque 2011: 53).

By understanding decolonisation as a liberating process to many other besides Indigenous Peoples, Choque's notion can be understood as an umbrella term to face "all forms of social, cultural and economic exclusion", fighting for the "civil and political rights" of those "seeking equality and justice" (Choque 2011: 55). Though this process of an all-encompassing decolonisation, reeling in all other social struggles, would need intense dialogue and constant

negotiating between its constituent parts not to repeat the same patterns of power inequalities, how can it be undertaken if championed by the nation-state, which, according to Patricia Chávez herself, "tends to reproduce colonial principles in matters of decision making, power administration, hierarchical organisation and stratification" (Chávez 2011: 27)?

Although there is a constant flux of influences between different cultural frameworks, meaning that neither "side" is immune to and beyond contact and impact, the level of intensity and the power of said interactions is far from proportional; Indigenous cultures do influence the culture of Western capitalism but the latter frames the relationship with the former through a lens of domination and subordination, one which an intercultural approach might help disentangle. This interculturality outlook must also be exerted when dealing with different groups of Indigenous Peoples, as such a multiplicity of societies can't be understood as a single, homogeneous mass devoid of distinct groups, ideas, cosmologies, wants and wills, but as active and subject of its own place in a web of interconnectivity, negotiating cultures, spaces and identities actively.

5.2 Identity

The problematic of cultural identity has been debated endlessly, from angles and perspectives that range from the more essentialising and solid (Friedman 1994) to the less-defining and liquid (Ewing 1990, Bauman 2000). From this debate has emerged the notion that the "old identities which stabilized the social world for so long are in decline, giving rise to new identities fragmenting the modern individual as a unified subject" (Hall 1996: 596).

Tracing back the concept historically, Hall distinguishes between three concepts of identity; of the Enlightenment, sociological (modern) and post-modern subjects (Hall 1996). The Enlightenment subject revolved around a "centered, unified individual" (ibid: 597), subjected to little morphing from birth to death. It has been understood and attached to the idea of nationhood since the advent in eighteen-century Europe of nation-states as we know them (Macdonald 2006), mainly due to the concise efforts of the countries themselves and the need to assert a common denominator amongst its inhabitants (Dervin 2012), a concept that, as echoed by Hall, has been shaken by the fast-paced change characteristic of contemporary societies (Hall 1996). The modern, or sociological, subject was a mirror image of its surrounding world, gaining consciousness of the lack of individual autonomy and independence and the role of other mediating forces; this concept reinforces the idea that identity is "formed

in the "interaction" between self and society", creating the connection between the individual and the public sphere that surrounds it (Hall 1996: 597), sewing them together, allowing for a malleable adaptation from the part of the subject. This kind of identity, which has become the norm when talking about the topic, is the one that has been seen by some scholars as liquid (Bauman 2000) or under tremendous stress, becoming "fragmented", with "several, sometimes contradictory or unresolved, identities" (Hall 1996: 598), leading to an identification procedure that has become "more open-ended, variable, and problematic" (ibid), which culminates in the third of Hall's identity subjects, the post-modern one. The post-modern subject's identity is continuously and perpetually shifting and being reshaped, delineated by its surrounding cultural arrangements and historical context; in a sense, the "subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent "self"" (Hall 1996: 598), in stark contrast with the first identity understanding, often still embodied by nation-states.

Howarth, similarly, understands postmodernity's (or perhaps liquid modernity's?) identity as "an individual's sense of who they are in relation to others around them. This simultaneously incorporates a sense of belonging and shared knowledge and a sense of difference and individuality" (Howarth 2011: 2), an attitude that recognises that "people cross various collective and individual positioning and voices on a daily basis, which can be opposed" (Dervin 2012: 184) and even seemingly incompatible. As Ewing puts it regarding our current understanding of identity:

> "in all cultures people can be observed to project multiple, inconsistent self-representations that are context dependent and may shift rapidly. At any particular moment a person usually experiences his or her articulated self as a symbolic, timeless whole, but this self may quickly be displaced by another, quite different "self", which is based on a different definition of the situation" (Ewing 1990: 251)

Dervin, likewise, argues that culture can't be anything but "plural, changing, adaptable, constructed", for that malleability is its most essential feature; in his own words, "a culture that does not change and exchange with other cultures is a dead culture" (Dervin 2012: 182). Some authors go even further in dealing with culture, arguing that the very concept is obsolete and inappropriate to account for our current cultural diversity (Abdallah-Pretceille 2006), a multiplicity echoed by Bauman (2000). Hall's two approaches towards cultural identity resonate with this work; on the one hand, cultural identity can be understood as a macro-structure, a "one, shared culture" or, as he himself says, a sort of a "one true self" (Hall 1990: 223), reflecting a common shared history and "one people" that constitutes the main reference backdrop against which all other (albeit possibly significant) differences are minimised, often

a feature of the Pan-fill-in-the-blank movements (and present in the Pan-Indigenism of Bolivia). On the other hand, cultural identity is significantly related to the process of "becoming", rather than being a pre-existing entity that is (and has been) immune to constant entropy and fluidity. Without denying the historical origin of a certain cultural identity, Hall repels the possibility of it being "eternally fixed in some essentialised past" by virtue of being "subject to the continuous "play" of history, culture and power" (ibid: 225).

5.3 Indigeneity

Much like most of cultural studies' concepts, indigeneity and its precise contours are hard to delineate. This difficulty is two-fold and stems from two seemingly disconnected branches but conceptually closer cognates; on the one hand, the initial struggle runs along the ones above mentioned about essentialising terms and solidifying cultural concepts and ideas. What does it mean to be Indigenous? What does it entail and what does it preclude? On the other hand, lies the problem of identification. Who is Indigenous? And who gets to decide/define who is and who is not? Current practice answers our second predicament by leaving such a burden on those that identify thusly, the Indigenous communities and groups themselves. It has been the accepted international standard since the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, now dissolved, promulgated a declaration in 1977 that stated that only Indigenous Peoples had the right to define Indigenous Peoples (Corntassel 2003).

This current dilemma has gained increasingly more attention as self-proclaimed Indigenous Peoples have risen to positions of real political agency throughout many parts of the world, namely in South America and in Bolivia. Indigeneity in Bolivia has, therefore, changed considerably throughout time. This "movement" was, between 1952 and 1971, a markedly "cultural elite movement which advocated for the continuation of the traditional cultural practices and opposed the modernisation of the Indigenous communities" (Chachaki 2015: 215), an attitude no longer widely advocated by many. Specifically, being Indigenous has many layers of meaning in Bolivia. Not only has this marker become "a rights - and resource - bearing identity" (Weber 2013: 194) but it has also garnered new meanings since Evo Morales has risen to power and the *Movimiento al Socialismo* has tried to promote a "more inclusive urban-based indigeneity that seeks to embrace the Bolivian public" (ibid). These political happenings have catapulted Indigenous identity and indigeneity to the forefront of the nation's public discussion

arenas, with more and more nationals seeing themselves as part of the broad scope of the term "Indigenous" (Canessa 2007).

Some authors, such as Ranta, define indigeneity as "a historically constructed, mobile and multiple term which articulates a set of positions and struggles" (Ranta 2014: 60), arguing that every self-identification by Indigenous groups is a "positioning" historically contextualised and particular, and reshaping all their relations with those framed within this articulation. Indigeneity, like ethnicity, "can be defined as the social and cultural constructions of specific peoples that share common traits including ancestry, language, beliefs, values, and so forth" (ibid), but it differs in three particular features, in the sense that it presupposes a shared global identity, a framework established by international law and a presence and occupation of a certain territory.

Framing this macro-Indigenous movement within which the Bolivian one is inserted are the International Labour Organization's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007, legal documents that estipulate the definitions of Indigenous Peoples, while at the same time stating that self-identification is the main criterion to determine indigeneity. This internationalised framework has removed some of the constant back and forth of identity performing, "normalising" indigeneity, at least from a legal standpoint. According to UN stipulations, "any definition of indigenous peoples has to include four criteria: first, priority in time in respect to specific territory; second, cultural distinctiveness; third, self-identification; and fourth, an experience of discrimination, dispossession and marginalisation" (Ranta 2014: 61). That is not to say that all Indigenous groups are the same nor that they have the same situations, be they political, social and/or economical, only that the Indigenous movements have grown stronger internationally on the basis of what unites them, even though this tactic of strategic essentialism, as some have called it, simplifies a cultural discussion in order to give voices to those that have none (Spivak 2006), sometimes at the price of being essentialised to "qualify as indigenous in global forums" (Ranta 2014: 62) and have a voice.

Some authors have delved into indigeneity in Bolivia, seeing it as a constant negotiation, with profound social and political implications. Nancy Postero analyses Bolivian indigeneity in the Morales era through the prism of power relations and how Indigenous Peoples have dealt with enduring structures of racism and inequality, and how they are reshaping their own role as political actors, claiming recognition and inclusion. According to the author, indigeneity and

its constant negotiation have changed dramatically since Morales' first electoral victory in 2005 and especially since the refounding of the state in 2009, for "native peoples and their customs have become the icons of a new plurinational society" (Postero 2013: 107). Postero recaps what the concept of indigeneity has meant in Bolivia throughout its history, again reinforcing the flexible conceptualisation of the term, noting, like Ranta, that "indigeneity is a historically contingent formulation that changes over time, and it is a relational concept that emerges from contested social fields of difference and sameness" and, because of that constant negotiated space, "who counts as 'indigenous' is a fundamentally political question, since such representations emerge from struggles over particular social, cultural, and economic matters during particular moments" (Postero 2013: 108).

Regardless of Indigenous Peoples' attempts to overcome this stereotyped vision of their own identity, "Indians were still considered obstacles to national progress" and "the antithesis of modernity" (Postero 2013: 109) during much of the Republican era until the rise of Evo Morales. This outlook towards Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia led to the ubiquity of the preferred term for Indigenous Peoples in the country, *originarios campesino*, a remnant from the 1952 Revolution; as its own attempt to solve what Postero calls "the Indian Question", the "category of Indian was erased and rural peoples were considered *campesinos*, or peasants; their difference elided to produce a mestizo nation" (Postero 2013: 109). Therefore, the re-emergence of the term 'Indigenous' only came in the 1980s and 1990s riding a global wave of Indigenous Peoples rights, with different strategies employed by distinct groups; whereas "lowland groups organized around indigenous identity and demands for territory", those of the highlands "organized around cultural recognition and political participation" (ibid).

In sum, indigeneity in Bolivia has moved from being, in the 1980s and 1990s, a "platform for reclaiming natural resources from the oligarchy and from transnational corporations", to meaning nowadays an Indigenous cosmovision as a 'scaled up' "resource for saving the planet" (Postero 2013: 110), which can be attested by the political usage of *vivir bien* by Morales and his government (Ranta 2014). It is still a "concept critical both for governing the nation and for contesting the meaning of the nation and the role of Indigenous Peoples within it" (Postero 2013: 109), and Evo Morales has used indigeneity heavily as a means to legitimise his political program.

6 Framing Theory

The concept of framing theory and frame analysis has been developed more and more since the early 1970's, with Erving Goffman's *Frame Analysis* being a seminal work in the study of frames through the prism of Sociology and Social Psychology. Whereas Goffman describes frames as "definitions of a situation (…) built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them" (Goffman 1976: 10-11), the usage of the term and its relevancy within Communication Studies is more prevalent to this analysis. In that realm, Robert M. Entman's *Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm* is the starting point for positioning frame analysis within the scope of this work. Entman describes the concept of framing as one which "consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text" and "illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location – such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel – to that consciousness" (Entman 1993: 51-52). Entman lists the basic features of framing as twofold; on the one hand, there is *selection*, while on the other hand there is *salience*. In defining these two concepts, Entman expands on what framing is by adding that:

> "to frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described" (Entman 1993: 52).

Frames, in this perspective, "*define problems"*, "*diagnose causes"*, "*make moral judgements"* and *"suggest remedies"* (Entman 1993). These four characteristics are not all always necessarily present in every frame, although some of them may occur simultaneously as well. Alongside these four features, Entman also positions frames in four distinct locales of the communication process; the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture (Entman 1993: 52). Communicators decide what is conveyed and how, and which frames, which he calls *schemata*, are used as organising guidelines. These decisions are not always done consciously, as these underlying principles can go unperceived even to the communicator itself. The texts themselves, therefore, contain the frames instilled by the communicators, "manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements" (Entman 1993: 52). However, the frames chosen and used by the communicator

in the text are not necessarily the ones that the receiver uses to make sense of the information conveyed. To that effect, the last of the locations in which Entman posits frames, culture, can be more relevant, as culture is understood in this sense as "the stock of commonly invoked frames", as the "empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping" (ibid: 53). The act of framing, therefore, as mentioned above, selects and highlights, using the features which it decides to emphasise to argue about an existing problem, what causes it, how it is assessed and what can be done to solve it.

Stephen Reese, in his *Prologue - Framing Public Life* (2001), expands the conceptual framework and defines frames as "*organizing principles* that are socially *shared* and *persistent* over time, that work *symbolically* to meaningfully *structure* the social world" (Reese 2001: 5). Some other authors, such as Pan and Kosicki (1993), suggest that frames are connected and intertwined by the presence of four structures in frames (syntactical, script, thematic, and rhetorical), whereas Gamson and Modigliani (1989) identify framing devices such as metaphors, catchphrases, exemplars, depictions, and visual images[9]. Reese's framing model leads to many questions regarding the topic and focuses particularly on power relationships, institutions and how these create and "support certain routine and persistent ways of making sense of the social world" (Reese 2001: 12). This is particularly important in regards to the present study, as frames are "connected to asymmetric interests" and "the power to frame depends on access to resources, a store of knowledge, and strategic alliances" (ibid), which then set the table for what becomes normalised discourse and practices.

7 Material and Methodology

The research data consists of 72 articles in total, collected from the online repositories of *Cambio* (18), *El Deber* (20), *La Razón* (12) and *Página Siete* (22). The four newspapers were chosen for different reasons, pertinent to the particular aim of this research. Whereas the first three (*El Deber, La Razón,* and *Página Siete*) are the biggest media outlets by circulation in the country and/or the leading newspapers in their regions (as is the case with *El Deber*, from Santa Cruz, Bolivia's most populous city), *Cambio* was chosen because it is the state's official

[9] The specifically linguistic nature of these two analyses, although important and acknowledged in this study, were not part of the methodology of my own examination.

newspaper, providing an insight into the government's position on the topic. The preliminary query to retrieve the articles was conducted under the search terms of "*indígena"* (Indigenous (person), in Spanish), though the first results were generally too broad and included articles whose scope fell outside of the aim of this study. The articles were then chosen according to their pertinence as it relates to the topic of Indigenous peoples' representations, which was done initially by skimming out the less detailed ones and retaining those which contained substantial information about the topic at hand.

The methodologies chosen to analyse the articles were that of frame analysis and of content analysis, in order to try and provide a better contextual understanding of the data collected. Frame analysis, however, represents the bulk of the analysis here conducted and the results presented derive mainly from this approach. The method used was an adaption of different methodologies, in order to better suit the work at hand. Semetko and Valkenburg propose a five-frame analysis of the news in their study about European politics in the Netherlands. This five-frame analysis stems from an attempt to systematise framing studies and analyses to improve intercoder reliability via the usage of a binary coding strategy, facilitating a broader and quantitative study.

According to these authors in their study in 2000, "Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News", there are two distinct analytical possibilities when it comes to studying frames in the news: an inductive and a deductive approach. The inductive approach focuses on "analyzing a news story with an open view to attempt to reveal the array of possible frames, beginning with very loosely defined preconceptions of these frames" (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000: 94). Although it provides a much deeper and more thorough analysis, the inductive method is labour intensive and hard to replicate, producing better results when the sample size of analysis is small. On the other hand, and as an attempt to systematise the methodology in the field of frame analysis, Semetko and Valkenburg postulate the deductive approach as "predefining certain frames as content analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the news" (ibid). According to the authors, "this approach makes it necessary to have a clear idea of the kinds of frames likely to be in the news, because the frames that are not defined a priori may be overlooked" and, more advantageously perhaps, "this approach can be replicated easily, can cope with large samples, and can easily detect differences in framing between media (e.g., television vs press) and within media (e.g., highbrow news programs or newspapers vs. tabloid-style media)" (ibid: 94-95). Using

Neuman's[10] study as a reference point for frame analysis, Semetko & Valkenburg investigated five key, major frames, which served as an inspirational methodology for this study; conflict frame, human interest frame, economic consequences frame, morality frame and responsibility frame[11].

Some other authors have gone further in their attempts to improve reliability and scientific validity. Matthes & Kohring, in their 2008 study, *The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Toward Improving Reliability and Validity*, expound on many other approaches used in the content analysis of media frames, while pointing out the limitations of the deductive approach used in this paper and proposed by Semetko & Valkenburg. The authors point out its shortcomings; the emphasis on capturing "the latent or cultural meanings of a text", the lack of understanding about "which elements should be present in an article or news story to signify the existence of a frame", and the inherent difficulty in content analysis when it comes to reliability are all points of criticism regarding this method (Mattes & Kohring 2008: 263).

Regarding this thesis specifically, the method chosen was that proposed by Semetko and Valkenburg (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000), incorporating and adapting aspects from Cheas' (Cheas 2017) research on the width and breadth of media frames, while at the same time acknowledging the limitations pointed out by Matthes and Kohring. To find the frames, I adapted and used Cheas' methodology, itself inspired by Semetko's and Valkenburg's, to better suit the present topic. In doing so, the initial methodology's five frames (Conflict, Human Interest, Economic Consequences, Morality and Responsibility frames) were ultimately reconfigured to Conflict, Credibility, (Political) Agency, Identity, (De)Colonisation, and Responsibility frames. Cheas devised a set of questions, inspired, again, by Semetko's and Valkenburg's methodology, which can be used to verify the existence of the frames in news articles. The Responsibility, Conflict, and Credibility frames (as well as the queries to encounter them) were adapted from her work (Cheas 2017). The remaining frames (Identity, (De) Colonisation, and (Political) Agency and their respective questions were created for the analysis of this study, mimicking the previous frames in content.

[10] Neuman, W. Russell, Marion R. Just, and Ann N. Crigler. 1992. *Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of Political Meaning*. Chicago: *University* of Chicago Press.

[11] As explained in the methodology chapter of this thesis, these five frames were adapted to the topic according to their relevance to the analysis; the conflict and responsibility frames were kept, while a credibility, (political) agency, identity and (de)colonisation frames were added, and the human interest, economic consequences, and morality frames were dropped/adapted/morphed into the aforementioned additional ones.

Unlike in Cheas', or in Semetko's and Valkenburg's frame analysis methodology, the frames for this research were not all consisting of an even number of questions. Whereas the Conflict, Credibility, (Political) Agency, and Responsibility frames consisted each of 4 questions, the Identity frame was composed of 8 questions, and the (De) Colonisation frame contained 6 questions, which leads to valid criticism about the true proportionality of the frames, although the extra questions almost always occurred overlapping with four initial ones. All frames had an even number of negative and positive dimensions within themselves. The inclusion of neutral dimensions was not undertaken due to the limited scope of this analysis and its limited occurrence. Much like Cheas points out in her work, coverage was either "clearly positive or negative rather than neutral" (Cheas 2017: 78) most of the time, therefore reducing the need to code for neutral frames. In conducting frame analysis for this topic, similar results were encountered and therefore neutral frames, scarce as they were, are not included in this study.

The unit of analysis was the paragraph, with each of them being coded for the amount of codes occurring within it. Naturally, some codes, and therefore frames, overlapped, making it hard to quantify which one would be the one setting the tone. In these cases, both codes were marked as occurring. The table containing the questions, dimensions and frames coded and found can also be founded in the appendices section of this thesis.

8 Results and Analysis

The analysis is outlined in different sections (one per newspaper) and their respective sub-sections (one per frame); each newspaper is analysed individually in its totally and each of the frames are analysed within each newspaper. The breakdown was conducted to highlight the differences between the publications and to better understand what role each frame played in the overall discourse endorsed by each of the four different media outlets. The articles are henceforth referred to by their numbers, for an easier reading of the text. The complete graphics illustrating the presence of each individual code and of each frame can also be found in the appendices[12].

[12] A full rundown of the articles and their respective titles can be found in the annexes, subdivided by publication.

8.1 *Cambio*

The analysis of the State's own publication, *Cambio,* revealed much of the aforementioned political emphasis on topics such as decolonisation, and the political and civil empowerment of the Indigenous population of Bolivia. The governmental discourse relied heavily on the stoking of identity and identity markers as key features in achieving these goals. The articles analysed stemmed from three different years (six from 2016, eight from 2017 and four from 2018), in order to have a wider range of topics and situations covered. There were 18 articles examined and a total of 509 coded occurrences.

In the 18 articles analysed, the **Identity**, **Responsibility**, and **(De) Colonisation** frames were the ones charted most often. With a prevalence of 28,1% (143 out of 509), 23,4% (119 out of 509) and 20,6% (105 out of 509), respectively, these frames set the tone when it came to *Cambio's* representation of Indigenous Peoples. The remaining frames - **(Political) Agency**, **Conflict**, and **Credibility** – were present in more moderate numbers, amounting, respectively, to 12% (61 out of 509), 11% (56 out of 509), and 4,9% (25 out of 509). Within all these frames, the distinction between negative and positive dimensions was also analysed, to better understand in which ways framing occurred. Of the ten least frequently occurring codes, as defined by the chart mentioned above in the methodology chapter, 7 out of them fall under the category of negative. By contrast, 6 out of the 10 most frequently occurring frames were categorised as positive. Out of the 18 articles examined, the code under the headline of "**Indigenous identity opposed to Western/*Criollo* identity**" (the most commonly occurring of the individual codes) was present in 14 of them. The prevalence of this code fell in line with the governmental discourse employed by Morales, in which Indigenous Peoples and their identity are constantly represented in opposition to *Criollo* or "westernised" Bolivians. This discourse resorted to this and other "othering" methods as the backbone of the new State-backed indigeneity, based on ethnic purity and dualistic contrasts, as previously discussed.

The five most commonly occurring individual codes were "**Indigenous identity opposed to Western/*Criollo* identity**" (52 occurrences out of 509 – 10,2%), "**Responsible for a particular situation**" (46 out of 509 – 9%), "**Colonial time negatively**" (43 out of 509 – 8,4%), "**Affected by a particular situation**" (41 out of 509 – 8,1%) and "**Indigenous Peoples (political) agency described positively**" (39 out of 509 – 7,7%). In contrast, the five least commonly occurring codes were **"Decolonisation as illegitimate"** (0 out of 509 – 0%),

"Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected" (0 out of 509 – 0%), **"Pre-Columbian identity negatively"** (2 out of 509 – 0,39%), **"Colonial time positively"** (2 out of 509 – 0,39%) and **"Concern about Indigenous Peoples ability to handle situations"** (2 out of 509 – 0,39%), whose absence shed favourable light on Indigenous Peoples, while contrasting it with the non-Indigenous Bolivia.

8.1.1 Conflict Frame

The **Conflict Frame** was composed, like all the others, of negative and positive codes. The negative codes in the conflict frame were **"Negative confrontations"** (the most common of the codes in the **Conflict Frame**), and **"Mutual reproaching"**. These two codes occurred in instances where the discourse constantly lumped Indigenous Peoples and the MAS governmental programme together, as partners and side by side, and framed the political opposition as anti-Indigenous, not just against the government and their *proceso de cambio* but also against Indigenous groups in general. Some of these texts were quite politically charged and reflect the intertwined nature of indigeneity, Indigenous Peoples and the MAS government in Bolivia. As an example, regarding Indigenous autonomies, vice-president Álvaro García Linera urges those leading the process to "be careful with what they do because those who despise indigenous persons want this [indigenous autonomy] to fail"[13](Article 4).

Most of the **"Negative confrontations"** occurrences have a temporal component to it, in the sense that they mostly relate to the turbulent colonial and early republican past of Bolivia. There is a constant reminder, as if need be, of "500 years of resistance" and of Indigenous heroes of yesteryear such as Bartolina Sisa, Tupak Katari and Avelino Siñani. However, they are not limited to the distant past; the allusions to an exclusively Indigenous Nation – "if only the Indians ruled, this world would be a better place"[14] (Article 9) – act as a perfect example. On the other hand, the positive codes in the conflict frame were "**Positive agreements"** and "**Peaceful coexistence"**. These occurred very sparsely, only to highlight the partnership and sociopolitical symbiosis between the MAS government and Indigenous Peoples and groups (Article 11), as well as in relation to the allegedly equitable importance, relevance and prevalence of Spanish and Indigenous languages (Article 2).

[13] In the original, "*cuidar lo que hacen porque quienes desprecian a los indígenas quieren que esto fracase*".
[14] In the original, "*sí sólo reinaran los indios, este mundo sería mejor*".

8.1.2 Credibility Frame

In the Credibility Frame, the negative codes were **"Concern about Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"** and **"Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected"**, which related mostly to Indigenous Peoples' behaviour and expectations about it. This frame was the one occurring the least amount of times, representing only 5% of all the coded instances in *Cambio*. The first code appears only twice, highlighting the hardship Indigenous Peoples endure due to a lack of resources and in relation to the foundational processes of republican Bolivia, when Indigenous Peoples were barred from schools while citizenship was only granted to those able to read and write. The second one is completely absent.

The positive codes, **"Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"** and **"Indigenous Peoples acting evenly/better than expected"**, on the other hand, were only slightly more present. The first of these two codes appears 14 times and the second one 9 times, underscoring how Indigenous Peoples manage their heritage successfully (Article 1), are competent professionals (Article 10*)*, democratic and civil leaders (Article 11), entrepreneurial and independent (Article 13), and are politically active, and were even during the colonial and the republican era (Article 15), combating and rejecting stigmas of lack of agency and participation attached to Indigenous groups.

8.1.3 (Political) Agency Frame

In this frame, the negative codes were **"Indigenous Peoples' political agency negatively"** and **"Indigenous Peoples' lack of resources to achieve"**. The first code appears a scant three times, only in reference to how Indigenous People's political agency was perceived during the early republican past by those attempting to assimilate them (Articles 15 and 18). The second one is relatively more present, occurring 14 times, conveying the deficiencies and privations withstood by Indigenous Peoples, from a lack of money to preserve their history (Article 1), to water shortages (Article 4) to difficulties in access to schooling (Article 7).

The positive codes, **"Indigenous Peoples' political agency positively"** and **"Indigenous Peoples' abundance of resources to achieve"**, were a bit more common than the negative ones, though still occurring at different rates. The first one is the fifth most commonly found code in *Cambio*, appearing 39 times. It is found when exulting indigenous resistance during colonial times (Articles 3, 5 and 12), addressing indigenous autonomy processes (Article 4),

celebrating indigenous festivities (Article 6) or the fight for equality in education for Indigenous Peoples (Articles 7, 8 and 10*)*. The second one appears only five times, alluding to the recently implemented social and political changes which have brought Indigenous Peoples to the social and political forefront (Articles 8, 9 and 10), revealing that although some progress towards equality has been achieved, there is still much to be done.

8.1.4 Identity Frame

The **Identity Frame** was the one perhaps most central to this thesis, alongside the **(De) Colonisation frame**, and therefore comprised eight codes. The negative codes in this frame were **"Indigenous Peoples' identity negatively"**, **"Denying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**, **"Pre-Columbian identity negatively"** and **"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western"**. These codes appear very rarely, with the exception of **"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western"**, and always exposing the lack of understanding Indigenous Peoples still encounter (Article 17) and were forced to live with in both the colonial and republican pasts (Articles 12 and 18). The code **"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western"** is the most commonly occurring in the articles analysed from *Cambio*, appearing 52 times. It is employed both in regards to the past (Articles 2, 3, 5, 12 and 14) and to the current state of affairs (Articles 4 and 11), pitting Indigenous Peoples against the remaining Bolivian society, along alleged ethnical purity line.

The positive codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' identity positively"**, **"Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**, **"Pre-Columbian identity positively"** and **"Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western"**) all occur in similar numbers (27, 23, and 21, respectively), with only the last one, **"Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western",** deviating from the norm, appearing only 8 times, in stark contrast with its opposite, **"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western".** These highlight how Indigenous identity and traditions are widespread and ubiquitous (Article 2), how Indigenous identity is allegedly more gender equal[15] (Articles 3, 5 and 6), how Indigenous Peoples have resisted and rebelled against colonial and external forces (Articles 9 and 12), their political agency (Article 11), and how equality can be achieved through the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge (Articles 10 and 17) into the public and national discourse. The code **"Indigenous**

[15] Although it is not the concern of this thesis, a gender framed analysis of Bolivian Indigenous Peoples and the media could be a fertile study ground, especially as it relates to the State publications and the social imagery of *cholas*.

identity equated/related to Criollo/Western" occurs to highlight the syncretic nature of modern Indigenous Bolivians – somewhat contrasting, or perhaps complementing, the dualistic discourse of Indigenous purity vs. *criollo* society (Article 2), to empower Indigenous Peoples and dismantle fixed notions of what an Indigenous person looks and behaves like (Articles 3, 6 and 13) and how well educated and politically active Indigenous Peoples can be (Articles 10 and 11).

8.1.5 (De) Colonisation Frame

This frame, like the previous one, contains more codes (six in total) than the four which compose all the others. The negative codes are **"Decolonisation as negative/difficult"**, **"Decolonisation as illegitimate"**, and **"Colonial time positively"**, which occur very rarely, appearing only 7, 0, and 2 times, respectively. **"Decolonisation as negative/difficult"**, for instance, appears only to demonstrate the difficulties Indigenous Peoples still encounter in regards to being fully recognised and respected (Articles 17 and 18).

The positive codes, **"Decolonisation as positive/possible"**, **"Decolonisation as legitimate"**, and **"Colonial time negatively"**, contrastingly, appear abundantly throughout the articles analysed, numbering 24, 29, and 43 occurrences, respectively, promoting decolonisation as a goal to be achieved, not just through political projects and decrees but also on a personal level, a change within the common Bolivian's grasp, rejecting essentialised stigmas and stereotypes. These can be found in relation to Indigenous autonomy (Article 4) , to Indigenous rights (Articles 6 and 7), to the incorporation of Indigenous history into the national psyche and historical consciousness (Articles 5 and 9), and to the re-appropriation and reshaping of days and festivities such as the *Día de la descolonización* (Article 3), formally known, and still known in some places throughout the world today, as Columbus Day or *Día de la Raza.* The instances in which these positive codes of the **(De)colonisation frame** appear always convey a message of defiance, urging Indigenous Bolivians to challenge the *status quo* and working towards reverting systemic and structural disadvantages facing the majority of the nation.

8.1.6 Responsibility Frame

The **Responsibility Frame** was the second most commonly found frame. It is particularly notable that it constitutes 23% of all the frames with only four codes/questions, in contrast with

the other two most common ones (**Identity Frame** – 28% and **(De) Colonisation Frame -** 21%), composed of eight and six codes, respectively.

The negative codes (**"Responsible for a particular situation"** and **"Affected by a particular situation"**) are by far the most common ones representing the **Responsibility Frame**, with 46 and 41 occurrences respectively. The former is used extensively in highlighting the role of the Spanish invaders regarding the many injustices Indigenous Peoples endured during the colonial era (Articles 2, 3, 5, and 14), but also how the Republican period didn't change much of this unequal situation (Articles 7, 9, and 15), equating *criollos* and Spaniards when it comes to perpetuating the existent power, economic, and social imbalances in Bolivia. The latter is the reverse side of the same coin, stressing who was always on the other end of this unequal struggle; it illustrates how Indigenous Peoples' traditional practices and beliefs were forbidden, dismantled and abandoned with the arrival of the European colonisers (Articles 2, 3, and 5), how a lack of access to education has prevented them from reaching power and decision-making positions (Articles 7, 9, and 15), and how a fundamentally different and clashing worldview has shaped Bolivia to their disadvantage (Articles 14, 17, and 18).

The positive codes (**"Solved a particular situation"** and **"Benefitted from a particular situation"**) appear at a much lower rate, with the first one occurring 26 times and the second one a sparse 6 times. These codes elucidate how Indigenous Peoples cope and successfully manage these systemic disadvantages (Articles 1 and 7), how Indigenous resistance and insurgency has contributed to an improved situation (Articles 3 and 11), and how the MAS' policies and Evo Morales have facilitated political and social emancipation (Articles 4, 9, 10, and 11).

8.1.7 Conclusion

Most articles emphasised either the qualities of Indigenous Peoples, their (political) agency and their ability to resist and fight back, using Indigenous heroes from the past and the present as examples to follow and inspirational figures, while at the same equating the non-Indigenous Bolivians with Spanish colonialism, stoking and inflaming conflicts along ethnic divides. As evidenced by the most commonly occurring frames mentioned above, the majority of the articles highlighted the injustices borne by Indigenous Peoples during both the colonial and the republican eras, the chronic disadvantages and endemic shortages they still endure today, and the ways in which their own political agency can dilute those differences. Through constant

evoking of Indigenous Peoples' cultural, ontological and epistemological purity, *Cambio* set the discourse along the lines of ethnic differences between Indigenous Bolivians and the so called *criollo* portion of society. The recurrent usage of these methods can be better understood by taking into account the State's discourse regarding ethnicity and its political relevance, which tries to deconstruct "racism and racist economic structures" (Postero 2013: 108) through the emancipation of Indigenous Peoples in regards to *criollos*. It is not only a social justice project but it is also a political promise, and *Cambio* blends both to further the government's own political agenda, program and survival.

8.2 *El Deber*

A grand total of 20 articles were analysed for *El Deber*, as there was a bigger pool to select from in regards to Indigenous Peoples. Unlike the other newspapers, every article retrieved from *El Deber* was from a single year; in this case, 2018. In total, there were 265 coded occurrences, split fairly evenly between the frames, with the **(De) Colonisation Frame** being an exception. The most common frames were the **Identity Frame** and the **Responsibility Frame**, with 64 and 56 codes occurrences, amounting to 24,2% and 21,1%, respectively, of the totality of the frames. The third most commonly occurring frame was the **Credibility Frame**, which appeared 17% of the time, coded 45 times, making *El Deber* the newspaper in which this frame was most present. The **Conflict Frame** followed closely, appearing 16,6% of the time, with 44 occurrences. In contrast, the **(Political) Agency Frame** and the (**De) Colonisation Frame** appeared only 13,6% (36 out of 265) and 7,5% (20 out of 265) of the time, respectively, making them the two least occurring frames. The latter frame in *El Deber* was represented at its lowest percentage when compared with the occurrence of the same frame in all other publications.

Much like most of the newspapers analysed, the difference between the prevalence of negative and positive codes was not drastic enough to warrant any conclusions; out of the ten most commonly occurring codes, six were negative, including the three most common ("**Affected by a particular situation"**, **"Mutual reproaching"** and **"Negative confrontations"**, with 22, 19, and 17 occurrences, respectively), and out of the ten least occurring codes, five were negative and five were positive, with the least occurring codes being, with only one occurrence each, **"Colonial time positively"** and **"Colonial time negatively"**, another sign of the relative little relevance of the **(De) Colonisation Frame**. However, the total number of positive and

negative coded instances revealed *El Deber* to be slightly more prone to employ negative framing, with a total of 149 negatively coded instances, compared to a lower total of 116 positively coded occurrences.

8.2.1 Conflict Frame

The negative codes in the **Conflict Frame** (**"Negative confrontations"** and **"Mutual reproaching"**) were particularly present in *El Deber*. The former was present 17 times, whereas the latter occurred in 19 occasions, making them the third and second most common individual codes in this newspaper's analysis, behind only the code **"Affected by a particular situation"**, from the **Responsibility Frame.** The first one of these codes appeared in eight different articles, with the bulk of it being present in four different articles. Articles 5, 11, 14, and 20 each had three coded instances with this code, with article 3 being the only other article with more than one occurrence, with two.

The **"Negative confrontations"** described in these articles account for clashes between Indigenous Peoples and Evo Morales' State, either by highlighting Indigenous Peoples' resistance nationally (Article 3) or by their pleads in international *fora* against the MAS government, denouncing the breach of Indigenous rights and demanding their upkeeping by the government (Article 5). The code is featured heavily in discrediting Morales' political project, either by declaring it too pro-Indigenous and partisan to an ethnic group/stratum of society (Articles 14 and 15) or by highlighting the still existing inequalities and shortcomings that the MAS government hasn't tackled or solved properly (Article 20). The second of these codes (**"Mutual reproaching"**), perhaps unsurprisingly, overlaps to some degree with the previous one. It is present in half of the articles analysed, with articles 3, 11, 14, 15, and 20 containing 4, 2, 3, 2, and 3 occurrences of the code, respectively, totalling 14 of the 19 times the code was found. The overall tone is similar to the one from the first negative code of this frame, with the parties involved in conflict being only Indigenous Peoples and the State, always personified by either Evo Morales or his righthand man and vice-president Álvaro García Linera.

The positive codes, much like in the other newspapers (with the exception of *La Razón*), appear in much lower numbers and concentrated. The first of these codes (**"Positive agreements"**) appears only five times, with article 2 containing four of such instances, all related to the way in which Indigenous Peoples manage to live in accordance with and without disturbance of their natural environment and how much one can learn from them, in a characteristic depiction of

Indigenous Peoples along the lines of what Lucero described as Indigenous purity and authenticity (2008). The second one (**"Peaceful coexistence"**), appears a scant three times, again highlighting the symbiotic existence of Indigenous Peoples with nature, not with other sections of Bolivian society.

In general, this frame is quite heavily slanted towards the negative, with Indigenous Peoples' plights being almost exclusively highlighted when, and only when, pitted against the present government, personified by Evo Morales, whose Indigenous background serves as fuel for mostly imbalanced political attacks. The only positive mentions of Indigenous groups are in regards to their symbiotic and environmentally sound lifestyles, perpetuating stereotypes of the pure, static and hermetic forest-dwelling Indian.

8.2.2 Credibility Frame

This frame was quite present in the articles analysed form *El Deber*, much more so than in any other newspaper. The codes were almost evenly split between negative and positive ones, with the former occurring 23 times while the latter appeared in 22 instances. However, the virtual equal of occurrences tell only half of the story, as the negative codes where widespread, appearing in eight articles, whereas the positive ones were heavily concentrated and only present in four, with one article (Article 2) containing 19 of the 22 positive code occurrences of this frame.

The negative codes (**"Concern about Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"** and **"Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected"**) appeared 12 and 11 times, and appeared in seven and eight distinct articles, respectively. Much like with the other codes, the overlapping was noticeable, as only one article (Article 1) did not overlap, as it appears exclusively in the code **"Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected"**. All the other instances overlap, with articles 15, 16 and 20 being the most represented.

In relation to the first code, article 20 contains four instances in which it is present. It highlights the difficulties Indigenous Peoples still encounter when accessing services in their native tongues, but mostly tries to delegitimise Evo Morales' credibility as an Indigenous person, claiming that, much like much of the State's institutions which still fail to adequately provide services in Indigenous languages, Morales' ability to speak Aymara should very much be in doubt, and, therefore, is real "Indianness". Articles 15 and 16 each contain two occurrences of

this code, with the first one being especially critical of the new politicised Indigenous movement and of Evo Morales' participation in it, in which the latter is accused of using the former for political gain, as well as downplaying the role Morales' government has had when it comes to improving conditions, both legally and socio-economically, for Indigenous Peoples. Much like the articles containing the majority of the coded instances of the previous code (**"Concern about Indigenous Peoples ability to handle situations")**, those in which this code occurs paint a similar picture; Evo Morales is only the Indigenous President by the mandate given to him by Indigenous Peoples, not by his self-identification[16], which *El Deber* systematically denies him.

The second negative code (**"Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected"**) appears eleven times, with most of the same articles (Articles 15 and 16) being the most representative. The former contained three occurrences of this code, while the latter comprised two. This code again seems to be personified by Evo Morales' shortcomings, with article 15, again, claiming that he, and by extension Indigenous Peoples, have misbehaved by squandering the economic bonanza created during the last decade, with no real change to the reality of Bolivia's Indigenous, with only (personal) political gain as the overarching and guiding goal. Article 16 follows the same line of thinking, highlighting how the MAS government uses the Indigenous image to "get away with things" and sliding by, since refusing, opposing or denying Morales is deemed racist on the count of him being an Indigenous Aymara.

Contrastingly, more so than in any other newspapers, the positive codes of the **Credibility Frame** appear in lower number than their negative counterparts, even without accounting for the caveat of 19 of the 22 occurrences stemming from a single article, something unique in all the four publications analysed. The positive codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"** and **"Indigenous Peoples acting evenly/better than expected"**) both appear eleven times, with the former found in four articles and the latter in only one, article 2. Articles 4, 12, and 18 each contain one coded occurrence, with the remaining nineteen occurring in the aforementioned article 2. In contrast with how Indigenous Peoples are represented when they are in position of political power and/or agency, Indigenous Peoples here (Article 2), portrayed as "keepers of their sacred home", deep in the Amazon, are depicted positively. Their knowledge and symbiotic living with the forest, their action and fundamental role in the

[16] In article 15, in the original, *"Es el encargo que le dio la población junto con el cheque en blanco de los votos. Lo hicieron el presidente indígena, cuando en realidad es presidente cocalero. Evo acepta el encargo-regalo y a los indígenas los hace su bandera".*

preservation of Nature are highlighted and highly touted, with constant reminders of the need to preserve their traditional ways of living and of preventing and mitigating climate change, which affects Indigenous communities first and foremost.

This representation of Indigenous Peoples falls in line with what Lucero called the "realness" of "Indians" and how it has been represented as frozen in time and with little to no agency, as mentioned before. Indigenous Peoples from the highlands have been often seen and cast, like in this case, as "less "pure" and "authentic" than their Amazonian counterparts" (Lucero 2008: 35), as previously discussed, as they have attempted to diffuse the Western-imposed views on what Indigenous means by engaging in politics and re-appropriating discourses and practices. Lowland Indigenous Groups, however, are showcased as what a "real" Indian should be and what they are allowed to be by extraneous identity-setting voices, which laud their "authentic" and "original" ways, as long as they don't go much astray and decide to participate in what has been historically reserved for the non-Indigenous Bolivians.

8.2.3 (Political) Agency Frame

The **(Political) Agency Frame** is the second least common frame in *El Deber*, representing slightly less than 14% of the total frames encountered, having been coded only 36 times. Its negative codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' political agency negatively"** and **"Indigenous Peoples' lack of resources to achieve"**) appear only five and ten times, respectively. Two different articles contain most of the occurrences for each code; whereas article 15 contains three of the five coded instances of the first negative code, article 20 contains six of the ten occurrences of the second negative code of this frame.

The first code reads similarly to the negative codes in the previous frame, the **Credibility Frame**, as the Indigenous Peoples' agency portrayed as negative is again Evo Morales', with his *proceso de cambio* roundly mocked and ridiculed, with the changes enacted (for they too can be seen) as always being sold short of actually achieving and representing real change. The same difficult process of separating Evo Morales, the political figure, from Evo Morales, the Indigenous person, is encountered here, as the politically slanted and polarised discourse makes it hard to unravel if the purposely negative representation is overtly aimed at the politician or covertly directed at the Indigenous person, and by extension, to other Indigenous Peoples. The second code follows a similar path, being coded when discrediting Evo Morales and, again, delegitimising his "indigeneity", though it also appears when dealing with the still real

shortages Indigenous Peoples encounter. These difficulties, however, are always used to point out the failures of Morales' government and his policies, much like the rest of the politicised representation of Indigenous Peoples throughout *El Deber*, not the historical conditions which led to this imbalance.

On the other hand, the positive codes of this frame (**"Indigenous Peoples' political agency positively"** and **"Indigenous Peoples' abundance of resources to achieve"**), appear in more contrasting numbers between themselves. The former appears 17 times, being the third most common individual code, whereas the latter appears only 4 times, corroborating the data from the remaining publications, in which this code (**"Indigenous Peoples' abundance of resources to achieve"**) appears only marginally, and always in significantly lower numbers than any other code in this frame, reflecting the lack of social, economic and political capital amassed historically by Indigenous Peoples.

Much like in many other codes, article 2 is the one which contains the highest concentration of codes which relate to a "positive" representation of Indigenous Peoples. Seven of the seventeen occurrences of the code **Indigenous Peoples' political agency positively** appear in article 2, with the rest of the appearances being scattered marginally across seven other articles. Much like before, it is the knowledge of Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon Basin which is highlighted and deemed important, with the coded instances overlapping with the ones previously mentioned in the **Credibility Frame**, perpetuating a Western-imposed view of what is "good" or "positive" when it comes to Indigenous Peoples, a necessarily polar "other" denied the same agency and participation granted to non-Indigenous Bolivians. The second of these positive codes appears only in four distinct articles, with each containing one occurrence. Article 6 talks about the support of international legal mechanisms in upholding Indigenous rights, whereas the rest of the articles (9, 18, and 20) also talk about the legal protections afforded to Indigenous Peoples by the Bolivian constitution, even if this is followed in these last three articles by an attack on the State and its definitely spotty record when it comes to abiding by this foundational document, with the TIPNIS confrontation as the prime example.

8.2.4 Identity Frame

The **Identity Frame** is the most common frame encountered in *El Deber*, accounting for more than 24% of all frames, having been coded a total of 64 times. Its negative codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' identity negatively"**, **"Denying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**, **"Pre-**

Columbian identity negatively" and **"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western"**) account for 25 of the 64 total coded instances, with 3, 8, 3, and 11 occurrences per code, respectively.

The first of these codes appears once in articles 16, 19 and 20; the first example blatantly attacks Indigenous diplomats or envoys, delegitimising their "indigeneity" by accusing them of being "disguised" as Indigenous, whereas the second criticises the political usage of the *Indígena Originario Campesino* as the example around which the State must devise public policies, and the third highlights the difficulties encountered by Indigenous People when accessing public services even when legal protections are in place for no discrimination to occur. The second code (**"Denying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**) appears in five different articles, but article 20 contains almost half of its 8 occurrences. In this article, much like before, it is Evo Morales' "indigeneity" being questioned, as well as his State's employees, who still discriminate Indigenous Peoples based on their mother tongue or their garments. The third code (**"Pre-Columbian identity negatively"**) appears only three times, with article 1 containing two of these instances. It is used to criticise the oft-employed discourse of Indigenous purity, which the government and Morales use time after time, as it denies the possibility of returning to a certain "pure" point in the past and a restart thenceforth, highlighting the highly syncretic nature of many aspects of identity in Bolivia, from the violin playing Chiquitos from the Eastern lowlands to the massive Oruro Carnival. This attempt to highlight *mestizaje* follows a similar path to the aforementioned sanitising of the Oruro Carnival and the removal of subjectively active Indigenous Peoples from it, as explained by Oviedo (2014). The final code of this frame (**"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western"**) is the most common of the negative codes, appearing 11 times. It appears in eight different articles, with articles 4 and 20 having the most occurrences, with two and three, respectively. The first of these two articles highlights the Evo Morales' speech at the United Nations, in which the president resorts to the same binary oppositions which permeated the articles in *Cambio*, urging Indigenous Peoples to identify "internal and external enemies to liberate [Indigenous] Peoples"[17], whereas the second of these two articles talks about how certain Indigenous Peoples use this same dualistic terminology, how this notion is pervasive throughout Bolivia, and how this is behind discrimination and how the State maintains its position to legally protect Indigenous Peoples from this kind of struggle and prejudice.

[17] In the original, "*es necesario identificar a los enemigos internos y externos para liberar a los pueblos*"

The positive codes of this frame, on the other hand (**"Indigenous Peoples' identity positively"**, **"Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**, **"Pre-Columbian identity positively"** and **"Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western"**), represent 39 of the 64 coded cases, divided in 14, 11, 6, and 8 coded occurrences, respectively. The first of these codes sees eight of its fourteen occurrences condensed in article 2, which contains more than half of these incidences, as it appears in only three other articles (Articles 4, 17, and 20). Article 17 is the only instance in which Indigenous Peoples' identity is not entirely confined to the aforementioned Western-imposed view supported by Lucero's work (although it still portrays Indigenous Peoples as mystical and metaphysical and under a similar light as article 2), as the piece highlights the existence and importance of Indigenous poetry. Article 20 mentions how positively the State sees Indigenous identity and how it is educating its own employees to better serve the Indigenous population without discrimination, prejudice, or the need for help from those versed in the until now non-Indigenous apparatus of the state. The second positive code of this frame (**"Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**) appears eleven times, with articles 2 and 17, with three occurrences each, accounting for more than half of them. These overlap with the previous code, as the coded instances are much of the same, again representing Indigenous Peoples as forest communities which preserve and live in harmony with Nature, which is present in and a fundamental part of their ontology and artistic expressions. The next positive code, **"Pre-Columbian identity positively"**, appears six times, four of which split evenly in articles 4 and 17. Whereas the latter conveys how the overtly racist and colonial perspectives, which understood Indigenous Peoples as incapable of producing poetry, are changing towards understanding and appreciation of the infinite beauty and diversity of both written and oral tales of all Amerindian cultures, the former conveys Evo Morales' own discourse on how Indigenous Peoples have historically been and still are the societal driving force in the Americas and on how they need to fight to reclaim political power. The last of the positive codes of this frame, **"Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western"**, appears heavily concentrated, as article 1 contains seven of the eight occurrences registered. In this article, a similar discourse of that employed during the post-1952 National Revolution can be seen (Lucero 2008, Oviedo 2014), as the experience of one specific group of Indigenous Peoples, the Chiquitanos, is used to dismiss the need to balance the power inequality which still exists in Bolivia. In stark opposition to the dualistic discourse of Morales and the State (and of *Cambio*, too), the article opposes the dismissal of the Republic era, during which a *mestizo* Bolivia was (allegedly) built, arguing that the Chiquitanos should serve as a model for the country, as one People which has incorporated

and accepted "Western" elements while keeping "their own". It conveys a message of *ex aequo* hybridity and syncretism, which was not the case historically and still isn't today. It uses the syncretic nature of other elements of the national identity of Bolivia, such as the aforementioned Oruro Carnival, to stress the *mestizo* face of the country, going so far as to say that perhaps the most important feature of Chiquitano identity is its colonial Jesuit past.

8.2.5 (De) Colonisation Frame

The **(De) Colonisation Frame** in *El Deber* is the smallest of its type amongst all of the newspapers analysed, accounting for just 7% of the totality of frames of this publication, with only 20 coded occurrences. Its negative codes (**"Decolonisation as negative/difficult"**, **"Decolonisation as illegitimate"**, and **"Colonial time positively"**) accounted for four, seven and one occurrences, respectively. As with other codes in *El Deber*, there is a high concentration of the coded occurrences in a small number of articles; in relation to the negative codes of this frame, article 1 contains seven of the twelve coded instances, being the one which has the most occurrences of each of the three negative codes.

As it relates to the first code, article 1 highlights that, although bringing the plurality of cultures and peoples of Bolivia together has been a tremendous achievement, the discourse of ethnic and cultural purity consecrated in the 2009 Constitution has also brought back "an old and sterile debate around the antinomy construction-destruction and the Manichean reading of light-dark and good-bad that intended the disqualification of the whole colonial period (…) and much of or the entirety of the Republican period"[18]. The article, written by the not-entirely-impartial former president of Bolivia and Morales' immediate predecessor, Carlos Mesa, dismisses the idea of a non-*mestizo* nation, highlighting the Chiquitano examples and their syncretic adoption of Jesuit-brought traditions and practices, painting a clearly opposing view to the State's *proceso de cambio* political path, erected on Indigenous precedence and antecedence, both temporal and cultural, at the expense of the *criollo*/*mestizo* society which has ruled Bolivia throughout the Republican era. Article 7 delegitimises Morales' decolonisation programmes and policies as a political tool masqueraded behind the and borne on the back of Indigenous Peoples, whereas article 15 does the same, attributing most of the social changes of recent times to the policy implemented in the '90s, before the MAS government was elected. The second

[18] In the original, "*reabrió también un viejo y estéril debate en torno a la antinomia construcción-destrucción y a la lectura maniquea de claros-oscuros y buenos-malos que pretendía la descalificación de todo el periodo colonial y, en esa dinámica, buena parte o todo el periodo republicano.*"

code overlaps, in regards to article 1 and its four coded instances, with the previously discussed code. Article 15 contains three coded occurrences, one of which also overlaps with the previous code, with two other paragraphs questioning the legitimacy of decolonisation, going so far as to say that "giving some spare change to the poor is not changing their reality"[19], hence downplaying the results and effects of the so-called process of change. The third and last of the negative codes of this frame appears only once, in article 1, reinforcing the good things that have stemmed from the European arrival to what is now Bolivia and how that has led to what is termed a "plural wealth" of cultures and practices.

The positive codes of the frame (**"Decolonisation as positive/possible"**, **"Decolonisation as legitimate"**, and **"Colonial time negatively"**) appear in lesser numbers than their negative equivalents, with three, four, and one occurrence, respectively. In similar fashion, the code concentration is high, with article 18 comprising of five of the eight total coded positive occurrences in this frame. This article, which contains most of the positive codes of this frame, most of them overlapping, highlights the actual positive changes enacted by the MAS government towards achieving a more equitable and fairer Bolivia, stressing the societal features which were (and to some extent still are) based on the discrimination and repression of Indigenous Peoples, legitimizing the need to enact this process of change and decolonisation. The article expounds how this *proceso de cambio* can be a blueprint for a plurinational state by highlighting the partnership between Evo Morales, an Indigenous Aymara President, and Álvaro García Linera, his *criollo* vice-president, bridging differences beyond race and ethnicity, building a nation that works fairly for all Bolivians.

8.2.6 Responsibility Frame

The **Credibility Frame** is the second biggest in *El Deber*, representing 21% of the totality of frames, with 56 coded instances. It is the most widespread of the frames encountered in the newspaper, with its codes appearing in 15 of the 20 articles analysed, with the negative codes alone being present in 14 of them. It also contains the single most occurring individual code, **"Affected by a particular situation"**, found 22 times.

Its negative codes are "**Responsible for a particular situation"** and the aforementioned **"Affected by a particular situation"**, which appear, correspondingly, 16 and 22 times. The

[19] In the original, "*Dar limosnas a los pobres no es cambiar su realidad*".

first of these two codes is found in ten different articles, with articles 3 and 5 being the most representative, with three occurrences each. Both of these two articles denounce the actions of the MAS government against Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, namely regarding the TIPNIS confrontation. The first of these two, article 3, is especially harsh and blames the government and the social movements which have ascended to politically relevant and prominent roles for having succumbed to corruption and turned their back on Indigenous Peoples when their political agendas and Indigenous Peoples' rights didn't match. The government's discourse and its actions are also criticised, as they seem to be paradoxically opposed, in articles 6, 7, or 13.

The second code, **"Affected by a particular situation"**, is both widespread and at the same time heavily concentrated. It appears in ten different articles (the majority of which is the same as the previous code), but only three of them have more than one coded occurrence, with article 20 having almost half of them, with ten such incidences. All of these occurrences relate to Indigenous Peoples being affected negatively by a certain situation, with Evo Morales and his government being the culprits in almost every situation, as Indigenous Peoples have suffered from the TIPNIS confrontation with the government (Articles 3, 5, and 6*)* and the executive is also responsible for still having not solved the profound historical inequalities in the country (Articles 7 and 20), although the reasons and culprits of those same inequalities are not brought into the discussions. In short, the negative codes of this frame almost exclusively lay the blame for unfair or unequal situations at the feet of Evo Morales and his government, pinpointing their shortcomings, while always portraying Indigenous Peoples as those most (negatively) affected by governmental decisions and policies.

The positive codes of this frame, on the other hand, appear in smaller quantities. The code **"Solved a particular situation"** appears 12 times and the code **"Benefitted from a particular situation"** was found only a scant 6 times, the lowest number of any code in this frame. The first of these codes is also heavily concentrated, with nine of the twelve occurrences stemming from article 2. In this article, Indigenous Peoples are credited as preserving the environmental balance of the ecosystem, as well as being responsible for halting habitat loss and deforestation in the Bolivian Amazon. It provides examples of how Indigenous Peoples successfully manage resources and are forefront protectors and fighters against environmental degradation and towards curbing climate change, while at the same time, through this responsible management of their own living environment, fostering their own cultural group and preserving their identity and cultural practices. Article 11 talks briefly about how millions of Bolivians have been lifted out of poverty during Morales' stay in power, and how the government congratulates itself

about that and many other achievements, only to revert immediately to a critical stance towards the MAS and accusing it of not tending to the totality of the population and being overtly and discriminatorily pro-Indigenous.

The second and last code, **"Benefitted from a particular situation"**, appears six times and his present in four articles, with articles 11 and 20 having two coded instances each. The instances coded in article 11 overlap with those from the previous code, whereas those found in article 20 are testimonies from government officials claiming that the laws in place already help fight discrimination and empower Indigenous Peoples, albeit also disputed and rebuked immediately in their aftermath.

8.2.7 Conclusion

Even though this is not an idiosyncrasy exclusive to *El Deber*, it is particularly hard in articles from this publication to disentangle Evo Morales, the president, from Evo Morales, the Indigenous man, as it is his individual shortcomings, over-emphasised for political reasons, which seem to shape the discourse on Indigenous Peoples in *El Deber*. In the other situations in which Indigenous Peoples are even mentioned, it is almost always for politicised purposes which seem to be aimed at delegitimising whatever policy, decision or stance taken by the MAS government. In many ways, Indigenous Peoples seem to be only of concern when they can either be represented as "pure" forest dwellers or as disadvantaged citizens which bring to light the political failures and shortcomings of Morales' *proceso de cambio*, and seldom the structural and long-term disadvantages Indigenous Peoples faced in the political structure and landscape that preceded it.

In general, there is a constant delegitimisation of Indigenous Peoples ability and agency, through carefully constructed though indirect attacks, aimed not at Indigenous Peoples at large but to the one which symbolises in Bolivia, at least discursively, the rest of Indigenous Peoples; Evo Morales, constantly accused of not being Indigenous, of being biased, partisan, corrupt, dismantling the social order to accommodate demands from Indigenous Peoples (and therefore "unfair" to the *criollo* and white sections of the nation), who up until now on the proverbial "short end of the proverbial stick". Discrediting Evo Morales, politically and personally, seems to be the least obviously and openly conflictive way of resisting the power balance shift without being demonstratively against Indigenous Peoples and their *ex aequo* right to full citizenship, education, civil participation, and so many other aspects of life in plurinational Bolivia, whose

movement towards an equal society puts those previously privileged at risk from losing those same perks so keenly denied to Indigenous Peoples.

8.3 La Razón

La Razón was the newspaper with the least number of articles chosen, as only 12 were selected. This was due to the lack of relevant publications specifically dealing with Indigenous Peoples or Indigenous issues. The majority of the articles chosen were from 2016, as there were nine from this year, with 2017, with two, and 2018, with one, comprising the remaining articles. In part due to the smaller numbers of articles analysed, *La Razón* had the least number of coded occurrences, with only 223. The two most present frames were the **(Political) Agency Frame** and the **(De) Colonisation Frame**, with 23,3% and 22% of the totality of frames, respectively, with the former accounting for 52 coded instances and the latter for 49. Immediately following these two frames was the **Identity Frame**, with 21,5% of the total, with 48 coded examples. After that, the **Responsibility Frame** appears at the lower rate of 15,2%, with 34 coded instances, before there is a noticeable gap between it and the two least occurring frames, the **Credibility** and the **Conflict** frames. These last two frames both appear below the 10% threshold, present, respectively, in 9,9% and in 8,1% of the totality of the frames, with the former having been coded 22 times and the latter in only 18 occasions.

Overall, there was a clear two-fold division between frames, with the **(Political) Agency**, the **(De) Colonisation**, and the **Identity** frames representing almost two thirds of all the frames, with the remaining three frames (**Responsibility**, **Credibility**, and **Conflict**) comprising the other third. In a slight divergence from the other publications, the most and least commonly occurring codes were quite contrasting; only two of the ten most common individual were negative, whereas on the other end of the spectrum eight of the bottom ten were negative. The coded occurrences are heavily concentrated in a handful of individual codes, with four codes comprising almost half (105 out of 223) of all the coded instances (code 10 – **Indigenous Peoples' political agency positively** (31), code 22 – **Decolonisation as positive/possible** (30), code 14 – **Indigenous Peoples' identity positively** (23), and code 29 – **Affected by a particular situation** (21)), though each code belongs to a distinct frame.

8.3.1 Conflict Frame

The **Conflict Frame** in *La Razón* is the smallest of all the **Conflict** frames analysed, both in total number of occurrences (with only 18, an even more contrasting number when compared with the second least coded newspaper in relation to this frame, *El Deber*, with 44 such instances) and in percentual value within a specific newspaper, amounting to only 8% of the frames in this publication.

The negative codes in this frame (**"Negative confrontations"**, and **"Mutual reproaching"**) appear only two and six times, respectively. The first of these two codes appears in only one article (Article 10), highlighting the conflicts (with physical violence, in this case) between Indigenous organisations which have not aligned with Evo Morales' programme and the MAS government, with the portrayed Indigenous person having been victim of assault by an organization affiliated with the State due to its political positionings. The second of the negative codes of this frame appears in three different articles; in addition to the aforementioned article 10, articles 1 and 2 contain two and three coded instances of this code, respectively. Article 1 discusses the conflicts between Indigenous justice and ordinary justice, with government officials claiming the latter could learn from the former, which is "in good health" and functions properly, unlike its counterpart. Article 2, on the other hand, discusses how Indigenous Peoples and their civil associations have to battle against the misuse of traditional garments and symbols by others, which have used Indigenous clothes to their own benefit without consulting and obtaining approval from the communities from which they stem.

The positive codes in this frame ("**Positive agreements"** and "**Peaceful coexistence"**) are slightly more numerous than their negative equivalents, but only marginally, each with five occurrences. All of the coded instances for these two codes overlap entirely, with three such occurrences in article 12, and one apiece for articles 4 and 6. These positive codes appear in articles dealing with Indigenous autonomies, emphasising and highlighting the very real possibility of a peacefully coexisting plurinational Bolivia, with Indigenous-managed territories existing side by side with the rest of the nation, aptly applying their own political, social and judicial laws within their communities.

8.3.2 Credibility Frame

The **Credibility Frame** is, after the previously analysed **Conflict Frame**, the second least represented frame in *La Razón*, constituting just 9,9% of all the frames in this newspaper. It is overwhelmingly positive, with the negative codes accounting for only 4 coded instances, as opposed to 18 positive ones.

The negative codes (**"Concern about Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"** and **"Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected"**) are, as mentioned, quite rare, with the former appearing only once and the latter only thrice, in articles 11 and 2, respectively. Albeit coded negatively, these articles talk about how Indigenous Peoples still encounter systemic problems and the ways in which they try to cope with them (article 11) and how certain Indigenous Peoples themselves misuse and appropriate Indigenous symbols and clothing for their own benefit, breaking the norm of needing permission from the communities to wear them (article 2).

The positive codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"** and **"Indigenous Peoples acting evenly/better than expected"**), on the other hand, appear much more often, though still with a certain degree of concentration. The first of these two codes appears ten times (in four different articles), while the second appears eight times (in two distinct pieces). As it relates to the code **"Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"**, the articles stress the success of Indigenous justice (Article 1), and how the processes to achieve Indigenous autonomies have been set in motion, as well as how they can be great examples of communitarian and civil participation (Articles 6, 7, and 12). The second code overlaps with the first one, with almost the same number of coded instances in the same articles. Whereas article 6 and 7 are not present, article 1 was coded twice and article 12 appeared six times, overlapping with the coded instances of the previous code.

8.3.3 (Political) Agency Frame

The **(Political) Agency Frame** is the largest individual frame in *La Razón*, comprising 23,3% of the total of frames. This frame in this particular newspaper is also the biggest **(Political) Agency Frame** of all the publications, but only in proportion and not in total number of coded occurrences, as only *El Deber* has a lower total in absolute numbers.

The negative codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' political agency negatively"** and **"Indigenous Peoples' lack of resources to achieve"**) appear in very divergent proportions, with the former appearing only once and the latter being found fifteen times, making it the fifth largest of all the individual codes in *La Razón*. This disparity is found in all other newspapers, with the first code being always less represented than the second. However, the code **"Indigenous Peoples' lack of resources to achieve"** is uncharacteristically concentrated, appearing in only two articles, articles 3 and 11, in sharp contrast with the other newspapers, in which the code appeared more widely spread and distributed in between a handful of articles and with less concentration. Article 3 talks about the long and arduous road towards achieving Indigenous autonomy, while article 11, which contains 13 of the 15 coded instances, places a heavy emphasis on the dire situations faced by Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, how extreme poverty is still rampant and it still forces many Indigenous persons to flock to the bigger cities during certain seasons, in particular the holidays, to try to sell their products and beg for money in order to make ends meet and survive.

The positive codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' political agency positively"** and **"Indigenous Peoples' abundance of resources to achieve"**) are also rather uneven between the two of them, with the former appearing 31 times, making it the most commonly found individual code in *La Razón*, and the latter being found only five times. The code **"Indigenous Peoples' political agency positively"** is not only the most commonly occurring code but also the most widespread, being present in nine of the twelve articles analysed. It is found in articles emphasising Indigenous autonomies (Articles 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 12), stressing how important these processes are in achieving decolonisation and self-governance, not just within Bolivia but also as examples to be followed all over the world, and in articles concerned with the need to create spaces in which Indigenous ideas and conceptions are taken into account, not just "taking them out of poverty" but doing so, if desired, by respecting their formulations about what amounts to quality of life and living well (Articles 9 and 10). Article 12 is particularly relevant, because it contains the most coded occurrences of this code, with seven, but also because it conveys a message about the different particularities and specificities of distinct Indigenous groups by enumerating the diverse ways in which these groups have gone about the process of Indigenous autonomy. The second one of these codes appears only five times and only in article 9, which emphasises the need to incorporate Indigenous ideas into solving problems which chronically and disproportionately affect Indigenous Peoples not just in Bolivia but in Latin

America as a whole, while at the same time highlighting the tremendous advances and policies which have been enacted to this effect.

In sum, this frame is quite positive in their representation of Indigenous Peoples, underlining the progress done to improve Indigenous Peoples' lives and in guaranteeing their rights, their fundamental role in advancing and implementing policies which ameliorate their situations, with only one overwhelmingly negative article present (Article 11), although with a positive caveat.

8.3.4 Identity Frame

The **Identity Frame** in this newspaper is the smallest of those of its kind in comparison with the other publications. It appears only 21,5% of the time, with 48 coded instances, with an overwhelmingly more frequent presence of positive codes.

The negative codes ("**Indigenous Peoples' identity negatively", "Denying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers", "Pre-Columbian identity negatively"** and **"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western"**) appear only 2 times in total, with the first and the last of the aforementioned codes having one coded instance each, in articles 10 and 1, respectively. The codes **"Denying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"** and **"Pre-Columbian identity negatively"** were not coded a single time.

The positive codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' identity positively"**, **"Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**, **"Pre-Columbian identity positively"** and **"Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western"**), in complete contrast, appear in considerable numbers, with the first three appearing more than ten times each (23, 12, and 10, respectively), whereas the last was only coded once. The first of these codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' identity positively"**) appears 23 times, being the third biggest of the individual codes of the entire newspaper. It is found in seven distinct articles, with articles 5 and 12 accounting for more than half of these instances, with six and seven coded instances each, correspondingly. Article 5 details Indigenous practices, such as that of offering a tribute to *Pachamama* (Mother Earth), and how the ubiquitous practice of reciprocity is part of the identity and the nexus of Andean Indigenous Peoples and their environment, whereas article 12 describes the many innovations created and incorporated by Indigenous Peoples in drafting and conducting their

autonomic processes, which take different shape according to the different Indigenous groups which negotiate and participate in them, moulded by the groups' respective ideas and notions.

The second of these codes (**"Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**) appears in more moderate numbers, though it was still coded a dozen times, appearing in four different articles. Once again, articles 5 and 12, with overlapping instances from the previous code, convey the identity markers which are relevant to certain Indigenous groups and in accordance to certain situations, from the choice of their own Indigenous autonomy name and designation to ritualised practices and the incorporation of certain individuals in the group performing their respective roles.

The third code (**"Pre-Columbian identity positively"**) was coded ten times, a stark difference from its negative counterpart (**"Pre-Columbian identity negatively"**), which was not present at all. It appears in four articles, once more with number 5 representing a sizeable part of the coded instances, with five such occurrences, highlighting the ancestral nature of the practiced rituals and the need for "liberation and decolonisation". The remaining articles (Articles 1, 6, and 7) allude to similar factors, using temporality to legitimise their identity.

The last of the positive codes of this frame (**"Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western"**) appears a single time, in article 1, mentioning the fact that Indigenous justice enjoys the same legal status as ordinary justice, as parallel yet not subordinate forms of socio-judicial resolutions.

8.3.5 (De) Colonisation Frame

The **(De) Colonisation Frame** is the second most common frame in *La Razón*, ever-so-slightly more present than the previous frame, with its 49 coded instances representing 22% of the total frames found. Once again, the negatively coded cases represent a much lower percentage of the total coded occasions than the positively coded ones, with the former accounting for 8 and the latter for 41 of all the coded occurrences.

The negative codes (**"Decolonisation as negative/difficult"**, **"Decolonisation as illegitimate"**, and **"Colonial time positively"**) appear very little, with only the first of these three codes actually being present, coded eight times in three different articles. Articles 3, 8 and 10 have three, three, and two coded instances each, respectively, and their discourse revolves not around the negative aspects of working towards decolonisation but rather on the difficulties

encountered along the way, in particular as it relates to the Indigenous autonomy processes. Article 3 stresses how the process has already entered its third decade, whereas article 8 denotes that the procedure is still excessively and extenuatingly bureaucratic. Article 10, on the other hand, mentions how political consensus is also hard to achieve in Indigenous communities, as the available legal processes towards decolonisation, such as Indigenous autonomy and self-governance, are put to popular *referenda* in the communities which they concern and sometimes don't garner enough support to kickstart the process.

The positive codes (**"Decolonisation as positive/possible"**, **"Decolonisation as legitimate"**, and **"Colonial time negatively"**), as mentioned before, are found much more often and present in many different articles. The first of these appears 30 times, being the second most commonly occurring individual code in the newspaper. Even though it appears in six different articles, it is heavily concentrated in articles 7 and 8, as they contain six and twelve code instances, respectively. Article 7 outlines the different ways in which Indigenous autonomy can be obtained and how other municipalities have started similar self-governance processes, such as Raqaypampa (previously featured in one of the articles analysed in *Cambio*), conveying a message of possibility when it comes to trying to achieve decolonisation, whereas article 8 emphasises how Bolivia's Indigenous autonomy model is a model to be replicated throughout the world, leading the way in the realm of legal autonomies of Indigenous Peoples, anchoring its claims in a study conducted in 20 different countries around the globe and analysing the level of autonomy of its internal states, autonomic regions, etc. Both articles feature interviews with Hugo Siles, former minister of Indigenous autonomies (*Ministro de Autonomías*), promoting a discourse similar to that of the State regarding the decolonisation topic. The remaining articles highlight the role of the MAS government in working towards Indigenous autonomies (Articles 3 and 5), the importance of the creation of Indigenous self-governments in reshaping the fabric of Bolivia as a plurinational state (Article 4), as well as the recovery of the status as a nation and as a people for some groups, like the Guaraní (Article 6).

The second positive code of this frame (**"Decolonisation as legitimate"**) was coded ten times, with articles 3, 5, and 7 containing eight of those instances, with 2, 3, and 3 each, respectively. Article 3 legitimises the yearning for decolonisation as a step in "rebuilding the Guaraní nation and being free, without being owned"[20], at the same time alluding to legislation from the pre-Morales governments which already conceptualised some legal framework which preceded the

[20] In the original, "*es solo un paso para reconstituir la Nación Guaraní y vivir libres, sin dueño*".

establishment of what are now the territories in the process of achieving Indigenous autonomy. Articles 7 and 8, on the other hand, legitimise the decolonisation claims with references to the ancestral and pre-Columbian origins of the Indigenous groups in question.

The last of the positive codes (**"Colonial time negatively"**) appears only once, in article 7, talking about the Indigenous autonomy process of Raqaypampa and highlighting the conditions which Indigenous Peoples have had to endure for the last five centuries. When taking into account its (absent) negative counterpart, it is evident that there is no emphasis in the profound inequalities and injustices of the past, only a positive conveying of the achievements of Indigenous emancipation today.

8.3.6 Responsibility Frame

The last frame analysed is the third smallest of those found in *La Razón*, and the second smallest of the **Responsibility** frames in all of the newspapers, with only the one in *Página Siete* being less prevalent. This frame was coded 34 different times, constituting 15,2% of the total frames in this publication. The **Responsibility Frame** was the only frame in which the negatively coded occurrences outweighed the positive ones, with 24 of the former and only 10 of the latter.

Its negative codes (**"Responsible for a particular situation"** and **"Affected by a particular situation"**) were found in very uneven numbers, with the first of these having been coded only 3 times and the second one on 21 occasions. The first code appeared only in article 10, mainly attributing responsibility to different parties (the army and the Government) in the failure of an Indigenous autonomy process in going beyond a popular referendum. The second code, however, appeared in six different articles, and was the fourth most found code in all of *La Razón*. Two articles stood out in particular, as articles 9 and 11 contained five and nine instances of this code, respectively. Article 9 emphasises the disproportionality of poverty amongst Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, with those defined as Indigenous representing only 8% of the region's total population, yet 17% of those living in extreme poverty. At the same time, it suggests that such a disparity is still prevalent not due to a lack of action from governments in tackling the problem but the manner in which these actions are conducted, as they don't incorporate Indigenous input and knowledge into improving their conditions, and very often trample over cultural and identity rights of those which they try to help. Article 11, echoing a similar tone, describes the rampant poverty and hardship still endured by Bolivian Indigenous Peoples, forced to recur to begging and seasonal migrations to survive, skating by on charity,

selling their crafts, playing some Indigenous instruments, some even at a very advanced age, as they try to make ends meet for their families, sometimes going to such extremes only to provide something as fundamental as basic education or food for their children. In both cases, the lack of and disproportionate access to education and the normalisation of this marginalised condition (for historical reasons) are some of the explanations brought forth about this topic.

The positive codes (**"Solved a particular situation"** and **"Benefitted from a particular situation"**), on the other hand, appear only six and four times, respectively. The first of these two positive codes appears in five distinct articles, with only article 8 having more than one occurrence, with two. Every one of the articles in which this code was found (Articles 3, 5, 7, 8, and 12) highlights how the government, by creating a mechanism for Indigenous Peoples to achieve self-governance, and these very same processes of Indigenous autonomy, have solved some problems and improved the overall situation and living conditions of Indigenous Peoples. The second code, appearing in four articles, highlights exactly the same, referring to Indigenous Peoples as having benefitted the most from these policies enacted by the government, while at the same time stressing their own role in advancing autonomies and transforming those laws into effective action and real outcomes.

8.3.7 Conclusion

Unlike most of the newspapers analysed, *La Razón*'s portrayal of Indigenous Peoples seems to be overwhelmingly positive, recurring to the positive dimensions of frames more often than not. The most common frames are **(Political) Agency, (De) Colonisation** and **Identity** (these frames also include the three most common individual codes, one each, from most common to least, respectively), emphasising the positive nature of the ongoing process of constituting a fairer and plurinational Bolivia, with Indigenous Peoples not only accounted for but as integral and fundamental parts of the re-founded nation. These three most common frames are almost entirely optimistic, with a positive to negative coded instances ratio of almost five to one (123 to 26), conveying a message of the possibility of achieving a more equitable nation which fully incorporates and integrates Indigenous Bolivians into its fabric.

The most heavily slanted of these frames is the **Identity Frame**, with 96% of its coded occurrences being positive (46 out of 48), followed by the **(De) Colonisation Frame**, at 84% (41 out of 49). However, and comparatively with the only other overwhelmingly positive news outlet, *Cambio*, the frames in *La Razón* don't rely on the same dualistic portrayal of Indigenous

Peoples versus non-Indigenous, with the two individual codes dealing with that question appearing only one time each. Highlighting once again the more amicable approach and portrayal of *La Razón*, the **Conflict Frame** and the **Credibility Frame** are not very present, with both accounting for less than 10% of the total percentage of frames. One reason for this could be the obviously less politicised stance of this newspaper when compared to the State's own publication, which needn't adhere (editorially at least) to the same criteria of impartiality. In sum, *La Razón* conveys a positive outlook on Indigenous Peoples' political involvement and agency, stressing the immense positive strides achieved towards decolonisation and the full integration of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, without skipping over the negative side of the struggles, bringing to light the problems and inequality still faced and endured by Indigenous groups in the country.

8.4 Página Siete

Out of the four newspapers analysed, *Página Siete* was the one from which the highest number of articles were retrieved, with 22. This higher number was a product of the wealth of pieces related to Indigenous Peoples, both in number, quality and relevance to the topic at hand, though this number does not differ much from the average number of articles per newspaper (17,4). The 22 articles analysed stemmed from three distinct years, with 2 from 2016, and 10 from 2017 and 2018 apiece.

Due to this higher number of analysed texts, *Página Siete* has the second highest number of coded occurrences, with 506, only a shade behind *Cambio*, which had the most at 509. The frame distribution was top-heavy, with the **Identity Frame** constituting almost a third of all frames, at 29,6%, comprising 150 coded instances. This makes this frame the biggest of all the frames encountered across all newspapers, both in number of coded occurrences and proportionately within a specific publication, with only the same **Identity Frame** in *Cambio* coming close, with 143 coded occasions and a total of 28,1% of *Cambio*'s totality of frames. This also meant that *Página Siete* was the only publication without multiple frames accounting for more than 20%, as only the **Identity Frame** was beyond that threshold.

The second and third most common frames, **(Political) Agency Frame** and the **(De) Colonisation Frame**, appeared in fairly even numbers and represented 19,4% and 17% of the time, coded in 98 and 86 instances, respectively. The fourth most common frame was the **Conflict Frame**, coded 69 times and accounting for 13,6% of the frames found. In contrast

with *La Razón*, this frame was both much more present and much more negative, with 86,9% of its coded instances being negative (60 out of 69). The two least common frames were then the **Credibility Frame** and the **Responsibility Frame**, coded 53 and 50 times, for a total of 10,5% and 9,9% of all the frames encountered, respectively. Although almost equally rare, these two frames were quite distinct in content; whereas the former was the only positively coded frame found in *Página Siete* (32 out of 53), the latter was the most negative of all, with 44 of its 50 coded occurrences (88% of them) being negative.

The overall negative tone of the articles analysed was also reflected in the distribution and ratio of positive and negative codes amongst the most commonly found individual codes. Out of the top ten most recurrent codes, eight were negative, while only three of the ten least frequent were equally so.

8.4.1 Conflict Frame

The **Conflict Frame** in *Página Siete* lands right down the middle when compared to the same frame in other publications at 14%, with 8% being the smallest (in *La Razón*) and 17% being the largest (in *El Deber*). The frame is overwhelmingly negative, as previously mentioned, with 60 out of 69 coded instances being negative.

The negative codes in the **Conflict Frame**, **"Negative confrontations"**, and **"Mutual reproaching"**, appear 35 and 25 times respectively. The former is tied for the second most common individual code in *Página Siete* and for the second most widespread as well, appearing in twelve different articles. In ten of the aforementioned twelve articles, this code is found on more than one occasion, painting a widespread picture of conflict. Out of these ten, two articles in particular stand out; articles 7 and 21 contain 6 and 4 coded instances of this code, respectively. The first of these two texts talks about how there's a conflictive divide between Indigenous and "Whites", how Indigenous Peoples are attacked and victimised by many non-Indigenous, whether be it through stereotyping (Indigenous Peoples are often seen as dirty, lazy, dishonest), patronising and inferiorising (often called "sons" and "daughters"[21],) due to fear and scepticism about their abilities and capacities (regarded as thieves and untrustworthy),

[21] "*Hijos*" and "*hijas*", in Spanish. This treatment of Indigenous Peoples is similar to those used to undermine African Americans in the pre-Civil Rights United States of America (and still afterwards), where and when akin terms such as "son" and "boy" were used to delegitimise non-Whites.

resorting to insults (such as *cholo* or *t'ara*) and derogatory terms (like *birlocha*[22], *cunumi* [23], *camba*[24], *colla*[25], and many others). The second article, on the other hand, expounds on how the history of interactions between Indigenous Peoples and non-Indigenous in Bolivia have always been divisive and conflictive, something one would expect to have subsided to some extent under Evo Morales' time in office; on the contrary, even though the MAS government has managed to incorporate many Indigenous groups into politics and as real parts of the Nation-State, the divide has grown wider, with polarised conflict between government-backers and opposers (often portrayed as a binary - *indio/mestizo*), along the lines of race and ethnicity. This dualistic outlook on politics was clear when analysing the articles from the State's newspaper, *Cambio*, as political opposition was continuously framed as ethnic opposition, with those which challenged Morales, the politician, being touted as anti-Indigenous.

The second of the negative codes (**"Mutual reproaching"**) is slightly less common, though still relatively widespread, appearing 25 times in 11 different articles. 10 of these articles are the same as from the previous code, conveying a message of a continuous clash between Indigenous Peoples, or those sympathetic to their causes and rights, and governments and companies which breach or don't uphold said rights, with articles 3 and especially article 13 as clear examples of this, the latter of which labels Morales as a "fake Indigenous person", engaging in similar portrayals as that from *El Deber*, questioning Indigenous self-identification.

On the other hand, the positive codes of the **Conflict frame** ("**Positive agreements"** and "**Peaceful coexistence"**) are much rarer. The first of these codes appears only 4 times in three articles, always highlighting how Indigenous Peoples can be important actors in climate change mitigation (Article 3), contributing to more social inclusion and support (Article 17), and empowering and emancipate Indigenous youth (Article 22).

The second code appears 5 times in four distinct articles, highlighting the part the much-embraced syncretism plays in Bolivia and its national identities (Article 8), how people from ethnically different backgrounds converge peacefully in their respect for democratic processes (Article 19), and how learning, practicing and being capable of engaging in multiple languages

[22] A derogatory term used for women, akin to *cholo*
[23] A term used for Indigenous children, either the offspring of Indigenous servants or Indigenous orphans taken in by the house ruler
[24] A term used to designate Indigenous Peoples from the Eastern lowlands
[25] The opposite of *camba*, used to designate Indigenous Peoples from the Andean highlands

can be a useful tool in Plurinational Bolivia, free from the fear and discrimination attached to Indigenous languages in the past (Article 22).

8.4.2 Credibility Frame

The **Credibility Frame** is the second smallest of all the frames in *Página Siete*, and it is also the only one coded "positively"; that is, with more occurrences of its positive codes than of its negative counterparts.

Its negative codes (**"Concern about Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"** and **"Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected"**) appear 10 and 11 times respectively, with articles 13 and 21 containing seven combined and overlapping occurrences of each code. The first of these articles highlights the many corruption cases in which Indigenous persons in politically relevant roles have been involved in, such as the *Fondo Indígena* case, highlighting how Morales and his "*k'aras*" and "fake Indians" have instrumentalised Indigenous Peoples for their political gain, using them as tokens and dismantling their effective political agency through this manipulation. Much like in *El Deber*, there is a certain tendency to frame Indigenous Peoples as easily manipulated victims, more often than not by Morales and/or his cronies, especially when they are somehow MAS sympathisers or supporters. The second article, on the other hand, questions the relevancy of guiding the political discourse, led by the government, along ethnic lines, as the polarization of Indigenous/non-Indigenous has put the Plurinational project at risk, with one such group having replaced another, with no effective change in the mechanisms and attitudes employed. Similar to other publications, it is hard to disentangle Morales, the politician, from Morales, the Aymara.

On the other hand, the positive codes of this frame (**"Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle situations"** and **"Indigenous Peoples acting evenly/better than expected"**) appear in slightly higher numbers, with each of them coded 16 times across five different articles. However, in both cases, article 22 accounts for at least half of all the coded occurrences of each code, with 10 in first and 8 in the second, displaying a similar code concentration as the same frame in *El Deber*, making these codes less widespread and salient. Article 22 speaks extremely positively about Indigenous Peoples ability to overcome the difficulty of having to live everyday life while using a different language than one's mother tongue, and how that has inspired a group of Aymara people to translate some widely used websites, such as Facebook, into Aymara, allowing many to use the platform in their native tongue. The conveyed goal is not for Aymara

to be “superior or inferior to Spanish”, but to be equal and treated on even grounds. This article and its heavy concentration of positively coded occurrences is the statistical reason for this being the only frame coded positively, as the other articles analysed amount to only 6 and 8 coded instances of the first and second positive codes, respectively.

Overall, even in this “positive” frame, there is a more widespread concern about Indigenous Peoples ability to handle situations, especially in politically relevant roles, as there are constant mentions to the corruption cases in Morales’ government; sometimes, though, Indigenous Peoples are portrayed as not being guilty of those misdeeds *per se*, as it is the government (and Morales) which leads them to such actions and with whom the blame allegedly lays.

8.4.3 (Political) Agency Frame

The **(Political) Agency Frame** was the second biggest of all the frames in *Página Siete*, with 98 coded occurrences, accounting for 19,4% of the totality of frames. Much like the majority of the frames in this newspaper, it was quite negative, with instances coded thusly representing almost two thirds of the total (64 out of 98).

The negative codes of this frame (**“Indigenous Peoples’ political agency negatively”** and **“Indigenous Peoples’ lack of resources to achieve”**) were quite large, with 21 and 43 coded instances, particularly the second one, which was the largest individual code in *Página Siete* and the fourth largest in all of the analysed publications. These codes were found in 10 and 11 different articles, respectively, five of which overlap. The first code only appears more than twice in two articles (Articles 7 and 13), with the former containing seven coded paragraphs and the latter three. The first of these articles talks extensively about how the notion of “Whiteness” was ingrained into the Bolivian national psyche and how that was constructed in opposition to the “unfit” and “unsuitable” Indigenous Peoples, not ready for relevant and important roles, and how that was and is reflected in access to education and political power, still today. The second article, on the other hand, talks about how the government has monopolised the Indigeneity discourse, how it has excluded Indigenous Peoples and how it has precluded them from enacting real change and accessing power, as it is “controlled” by “*k’aras*”; much like article 7, its negative side is not that Indigenous agency is not good or desirable, but rather that it has been stifled and curbed by both the systemic and chronic problems mentioned in the previous article and by the current government, which has defused it from within, taking control of the discourses on Indigeneity, decolonisation, and many others.

The second code, the biggest in *Página Siete*, is both widespread and concentrated, with article 7, once more, leading the way, with 18 coded occurrences, followed by articles 13 and 22, each with 4. Overall, it appears in eleven different articles. It follows the same pattern as the same code in all other newspapers by being much larger than its positive counterpart (**"Indigenous Peoples' abundance of resources to achieve"**), in this case with a staggering 43 to 1 ratio. The articles highlight, again, the challenges and threats Indigenous Peoples face, from being imperilled by territory and habitat loss (Articles 1 and 18), a lack of effective political participation (Article 5), still having to overcome long-standing inequalities and imbalanced structures (Articles 12 and 14), or being misrepresented and used as tokens (Article 13). Overall, the articles paint a broadly and widespread dire situation for Indigenous Peoples, as there are still profound differences between the planes on which Indigenous Peoples participate in everyday life and those which have historically been limited to *criollos* and whites.

The positive codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' political agency positively"** and **"Indigenous Peoples' abundance of resources to achieve"**), on the other hand, appear in wildly divergent numbers; while the former appears 33 times (making it the 5th biggest individual code in *Página Siete*), the latter appears only once. Much like in all the other previous positive codes, it is article 22 which contains the highest number the coded instances, accounting for more than a third, with twelve. Articles 10 and 20 contain, correspondingly, 4 and 5 coded occurrences. Article 10 describes at length the savvy ways in which Indigenous Peoples, both now and throughout the colonial and early republican eras, have engaged, distorted, subverted, and adapted foreign traditions as a tactic to reduce their influence, while at the same time allowing for the preservation of their own practices and ways, surviving through syncretism and re-appropriation. This has led to a collage of national celebrations and rites which blend Iberian traditions with Indigenous practices, and gives those which re-imagined them a sense of belonging and participation previously denied to Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia.

Article 20 emphasises Indigenous agency from a political point of view instead. It highlights how Indigenous Peoples had already blocked the possibility of constitutionalising indefinite re-elections, which Morales' was trying to pass through popular referendum (which he lost), as a permanent and non-cyclical understanding of politics clashes with widely held Andean beliefs about circularity and renewal. These principles were previously taken into account when the constitutional draft was taking place, but were now at risk with Morales pushing his political project beyond the realms of the term-limited democracy laid out by the 2009 constitution. In article 22, much like before, the emphasis is on the Aymara cyberactivists and their norm-

breaking and stereotype dissolving virtual activism, as they are heralded as examples that Indigenous Peoples can be whatever they set themselves out to be and engage in whichever activities they see fit, just like the rest of Bolivians.

The second of these positive codes appears only one time, as mentioned before, and it highlights, in article 20, the power Indigenous groups, associations and social movements had at the time of the drafting of the Plurinational constitution, which has since been eroded drastically, which goes not without mention in the very same article.

8.4.4 Identity Frame

The **Identity Frame** is the largest in *Página Siete* by far, accounting for almost a third of all the frames, at 29,6%, with 150 coded occurrences. It is the largest of the identity frames and also the largest frame of any of the frames in any newspaper. The frame is almost evenly split when it comes to negative and positive codes, though there are still slightly more negative (77) than positive ones (73).

The negative codes (**"Indigenous Peoples' identity negatively"**, **"Denying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**, **"Pre-Columbian identity negatively"** and **"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western"**) can be divided into two groups based on the frequency in which they occur; the first and last account for 26 and 28 occurrences, respectively, and the intermediate two contain 17 and 6 coded instances, correspondingly. The first of these four codes is quite heavily concentrated, with article 7 accounting for 17 of the 26 coded instances, as only one article had more than two coded occurrences. Article 7 highlights how Indigenous Peoples, their identity and their traits have been despised and shunned since the early formation of the country, in both the colonial era as well as during the initial stages of the Republic, with "European traits" being preferred and upheld as the desirable goal to achieve and strive for. It explains how "whiteness", seen here not necessarily through the race prism but mainly as what the author terms "symbolic capital", has been perpetuated by those which see themselves as "white", through taste, education, and political power, at least until Morales' breakthrough in 2006, which shook the social norm of "discrimination enacted by the "white" status against the "cholo" and "Indigenous" statuses"[26]. Article 21, on the other hand, reinforces the mixed identity of Bolivians, rejecting the dichotomy which has led to the polarization between

[26] In the original, *"la discriminación ejercida por el estatus "blanco" contra los estatus "cholo" e "Indígena".*

Indígena and *mestizo* amplified by Morales, which promotes a discourse of Indigenous homogeneity and purity.

The second negative code (**"Denying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**) appears 17 times, again with article 7 comprising of the highest number of coded situations, with five, followed by article 18, with three. The former, again, lists the ways in which Indigenous Peoples have been historically denied the right to their own identity, marginalised throughout the centuries, whereas the latter focuses on the dangers represented by the government's economic development program, which threatens Indigenous Peoples' communities and lands.

The third negative code (**"Pre-Columbian identity negatively"**) is the least common individual code of this frame, appearing only six times. The coded instances, however, were quite powerful in the message conveyed, urging Indigenous Peoples not to be stuck in time, living a past 500 years old (Article 2), and condemning the Bolivian State by accusing it of inventing the "myth of the Indigenous" (Article 4) for its own political legitimization.

The last negative code (**"Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western"**), by contrast with the previous one, was the most common of all individual codes in the **Identity Frame**. It was coded 28 times and found in ten different articles, with, once again, article 7 leading the way in number of occurrences, with eight, followed by article 22, with four. Article 7 highlights how Indigenous Peoples were seen historically as the antithesis of the "whites", the former incapable and unfit and the latter as models and barometers to aspire to, whereas article 22 brings forth the tale of an Aymara, whose experience of feeling deprived of his own language, and by extension, his own understanding of the world portrays an identity which is in stark contrast with the westernised worldview which he was force-fed through education and indoctrination as the only one acceptable.

The positive codes of this frame (**"Indigenous Peoples' identity positively"**, **"Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples' identity markers"**, **"Pre-Columbian identity positively"** and **"Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western"**), on the other hand, appeared in somewhat equal numbers, with 24, 13, 14, and 22 coded instances, respectively. The first three of these codes are heavily concentrated, with the previously highlighted article 22 being the most coded article in all of them, with twelve, three, and nine coded instances, respectively. The article portrays Indigenous Peoples in a very positive light, highlighting their activism, agency, and social participation, inspired by their identity as

Aymara. The last of the positive codes, on the other hand, appears concentrated in articles 2 and 19, which account for 10 of the 22 coded instances. The first of these articles rejects the *Indio* and *Indígena* tags, as they label one as inferior and are not an identity *per se*, pointing out how access to education has helped the many Indigenous Peoples feel on par with those seen before as culturally different. It defines Indigenous Peoples as "a blend of what was in this part of the world before 1532 and what had arrived with the bearded invaders"[27], urging readers to refute and refuse the cries to "hate the invaders" and instead see themselves as the result of the encounter between invaded and invaders. The second article conveys a similar message, this time focused on the political game of identity; it rejects Morales' insistence in the Indigenous-*mestizo* binary opposition, and the framing of those against Morales, the politician, as against the *Indígena*, instead appealing to all Bolivians not as Indigenous or non-Indigenous, but as citizens of a democracy.

In sum, the **Identity Frame** in *Página Siete* was perhaps the most balanced of all frames, with a healthy dose of both negative and positive occurrences; while identity is indeed a big part of the representation of Indigenous Peoples, the newspaper attempted to re-appropriate the discourse which Evo Morales has largely monopolised, trying to frame Indigeneity not just as a Manichean polarised discourse but as a constant dialogue between acknowledging the negative past, appreciating the immense improvements already achieved, and how there can be a steady walk towards a more even and fairer nation, which sees Indigenous Peoples as fully entitled and enfranchised citizens, with agency to shape, mould and engage with their own identity.

8.4.5 (De) Colonisation Frame

The **(De) Colonisation Frame** was the third biggest frame in *Página Siete*, behind only the **Identity** and the **(Political) Agency** frames. It was coded 86 times, corresponding to an even 17% of the total frames. Its negative codes (**"Decolonisation as negative/difficult"**, **"Decolonisation as illegitimate"**, and **"Colonial time positively"**) were found at very different rates, with the first two having been coded 27 and 34 instances, respectively, while the third one was not coded a single time, the only individual code not to have been found in *Página Siete*.

[27] In the original, *"En general, nuestra cultura era/es una mezcla entre lo que había en esta parte del mundo antes de 1532 y lo que había llegado con los barbudos invasores".*

The first of the negative codes was present in ten different articles, with articles 5 and 21 being the most representative, coded five times each. Article 5 portrays Morales' political project as having run its course, having gone as far as it could, with democracy being the ultimate curb on a decolonisation project, equating the MAS political plan, based on an Indigenous culture, as damaging as other "fundamentalist states"[28]. Moreover, this attempted re-founding of the state is seen as impossible due to the fact that the "the national identity was achieved by replacing indigenous elements with others which contributed to the formation of a wide *mestizo* middle class, beyond races and ethnic markers"[29]. Article 21 conveys a similar message, going a step further, claiming that the "liberation" of Indigenous political forces has led not to their emancipation but has turned them into a new kind of bourgeoisie, now struggling to accommodate Indigenous ideas and a capitalistic logic.

The second negative code was found 34 times, making it the fourth most common individual code in *Página Siete*. Although it is also present in a great number of articles (nine), it is also concentrated in a handful, with articles 4 and 21 containing nine and five coded occurrences, respectively. While the coded instances in article 21 are the same as in the previous code, article 4 expounds a critique of the State's usage of *Vivir bien*, how the concept is used as lipstick on the proverbial capitalistic pig, as a political manoeuvre and an ethical and moral balm for a government trying to balance an extractivist economy with the ideals and notions advocated by Indigenous Peoples. It criticises how the term has been politicised for personal gain and delegitimises any attempt to frame decolonisation with *Vivir bien*. Article 6, tagged three times with this code, echoes a similar sentiment, advocating for a real systemic change rather than a masked decolonisation attempt under the guise of *Suma Qamaña*, for the MAS' own political gain. This article conveys a similar message to that posited previously in section 5.1., as it was written by Pedro Portugal, one of the Bolivian authors whose take on decolonisation was mentioned in said section of this thesis.

The positive codes (**"Decolonisation as positive/possible"**, **"Decolonisation as legitimate"**, and **"Colonial time negatively"**) are much scarcer than their negative equivalents, as they appear 5, 5, and 15 times, respectively, for a meagre total of 25 coded occurrences. The first of

[28] In the original, *"En otras latitudes del mundo, la necesidad de refundar los Estados con base en los criterios últimos de la cultura originaria, la fe religiosa o la tradición tribal derivaron inexorablemente en regímenes fundamentalistas"*

[29] In the original, *"un fundamentalismo étnico en Bolivia es imposible, sobre todo porque la construcción de la identidad nacional se logró por la sustitución de elementos indígenas por otros que contribuyeron a la formación de una amplia clase media mestiza, más allá de las razas y los marcadores étnicos"*

these codes appears in four different articles, with article 6 being the only one coded more than once; this article portrays decolonisation as possible, but under a different guise, going deeper and more profoundly in reshaping the State, "overcoming the inherited colonial structures and replacing them with others", fit for today's Bolivia[30]. In a sense, decolonisation is possible, but not as it was previously conceptualised by the Morales government.

The second positive code of this frame also appears in four articles, this time with article 7 being the only one coded on multiple occasions. According to this article, decolonisation is legitimate based on the structural inequalities and injustices of yesteryear which still exist today; in a sense, decolonisation must be the diluting of those systemic differences which have concentrated political, economic, and social capital in the hands of the few (the *criollos*) to the detriment of the many (the Indigenous and *mestizos*).

The last positive code appears more times than the previous two combined, with its 15 coded occurrences being distributed between seven different articles. Much like in other newspapers, this code is found in articles which delve into the inequalities Indigenous Peoples have endured throughout the centuries, in particular during the pre-Republican era. Articles 2 and 10 are those with the most coded, with four coded instances each, illustrating the negative aspects of living under a colonial regime, how the sense of inferiority was drilled into the Indigenous psyche and how that is still seen today, a feeling which both articles try to dismantle by bringing forth the possibility of re-negotiating identities and re-appropriating concepts and traditions, incorporating aspects from both sides in a dialectic dance with no predetermined lead.

Like the majority of the frames in *Página Siete*, this frame is quite negative, with less than a third of the coded occurrences being coded positively.

8.4.6 Responsibility Frame

This frame is the smallest in *Página Siete*, with only 50 coded occurrences, accounting for only 9,9% of the total frames. As previously mentioned, this frame is the most overwhelmingly negative, with 88% of the coded paragraphs being thusly.

[30] In the original, *"la descolonización debe ser la superación de las estructuras heredadas de la Colonia y su reemplazo por otras adecuadas a los derechos y tiempos actuales".*

The negative codes (**"Responsible for a particular situation"** and **"Affected by a particular situation"**) combined for 44 coded occurrences, with the former accounting for 9 and the latter for 35 (making this code the second most common individual code in *Página Siete*). The first code was found in five articles, with articles 2, 3 and 13, having the most coded instances, with three, two, and two, respectively. Article 2 blames the colonial system for denigrating Indigenous Peoples and stigmatising them as inferior to the their European colonisers; article 3 faults the extractivist mentality governments in Latin America have and how that impacts Indigenous Peoples negatively, whereas article 13 deems the MAS government culpable for disregarding Indigenous Peoples and having conceded power back to "the white-*mestizos*".

The second negative code was the most widespread of all the codes, as it was found in thirteen different articles, besides being the second most common individual code. However, this code was concentrated mainly in four texts, as articles 3, 7, 13 and 18 contained five, six, five, and five coded instances, respectively. Article 3 is dedicated to the fact that, despite being the groups of people with the best track record when it comes to environmental preservation, Indigenous Peoples are still not part of a climate change mitigation discussion and policies, instead being those which suffer the most from decisions and activities most harmful to the environment. Article 7 describes the ways in which enduring structures of racism and inequality inherited from the colonial and the republican era still impair and harm Indigenous Peoples today, whereas article 13 highlights how the monopolising of Indigeneity and the discourses on Indigenous Peoples by Evo Morales and the MAS government has actually affected Indigenous groups negatively, as it has effectively shunned them from political agency and prevented other, perhaps more radical, forms of political organisation from coming to fruition. Article 18, similarly to article 3, highlights the dangers and perils which Indigenous communities face, in this case from the insistence of the MAS government in disregarding Indigenous and protected lands for economic gains, with the TIPNIS case being the thorniest of these abuses.

The positive codes (**"Solved a particular situation"** and **"Benefitted from a particular situation"**), on the other hand, appear only six times, with the former being coded four times and the latter only twice. The few positive instances of the first code appear in article 3, with Indigenous Peoples' extensive and successful track record on environmental preservation being lauded and praised, as deforestation as effectively been halted within Indigenous lands in the Amazon. The second code appears only in article 2, which highlights the ways in which Indigenous Peoples benefitted from the 1952 National Revolution, the first of many political

changes which led to the enfranchisement of Indigenous Peoples, as it was after the revolution that citizenship was granted to Indigenous groups.

8.4.7 Conclusion

Página Siete was the publication with the most negative framing of all newspapers, more so than *El Deber*, with a ratio of negative to positive coded occurrences of 1.8, with 327 instances of the former and only 179 of the latter. Much like in *El Deber*, there was a certain tendency to frame Indigenous Peoples as easily manipulated victims, more often than not by Morales and/or his cronies, though not to such an extent, as the qualm seems to be more with the MAS government and his political usage of Indigenous Peoples as tokens (without their approval or agreement) and his monopoly of the discourse on what it means to be Indigenous, solely for political purposes. The discourse seems to seek to promote a different type of Indigeneity, one which can be more radical and detached from the State's monopoly. Overall, the tone is not completely sympathetic to Indigenous Peoples, which are framed under a negative light more often than not, but mostly in relation to Indigeneity, perhaps more so due to the aforementioned State's monopoly on the discourse. Similar to other publications, it is hard to disentangle Morales, the politician, from Morales, the Aymara, though not to such an extent as in other overwhelmingly negative newspapers, like *El Deber*.

The most common frames in *Página Siete* are the **Identity** and the **(Political) Agency** frames, which together represent almost half of all the frames found (49%), which emphasised Indigenous Peoples' participation in political affairs, their right to contest and reshape concepts and notions of Indigeneity, as well as some topics which have been integral parts of the Morales period, such as *Vivir bien* and decolonisation. Though none of these two frames was coded positively (only the **Credibility Frame** was), the relation between positive and negative codes was the least pronounced in comparison with all other frames, with the **Identity Frame** in particular being almost evenly balanced, with most negatively coded occurrences of Indigenous Peoples' identity mentioning past abuses and how they still linger today, either by direct discrimination or more profoundly embedded systemic inequalities, following a trend found in the other newspapers.

Other frames were not so even-keeled, particularly the **Conflict** and the **Responsibility** frames, which, as with in other publications, tend to overlap and go hand-in-hand; the former was 87% negative and the latter was at 88%, with a combined 104 negatively coded occurrences, in

contrast with only 15 positive equivalents. In most cases, the blame was either laid at the feet of the government for not respecting Indigenous Peoples (and personally in the hands of Evo Morales) or at the colonially-infused past, which created such a profoundly unequal society, which disproportionately benefits the non-Indigenous, *criollo* minorities.

Similar to *El Deber*, *Página Siete* refuses the dichotomic understanding of identity in general and of indigeneity in particular, instead urging the readers to defuse and dismantle such notions in favour of embracing a national identity which incorporates all Bolivians, balancing out a melange of practices, ideas, traditions and logics which partly derive from both the New and Old Worlds. It does not refuse, unlike *El Deber*, the notion of decolonisation and its prevalence to even the balance of power in Bolivia, though it advocates for a decolonisation which doesn't pit Bolivians against Bolivians; in many ways, it is sympathetic to an approach which tries to move beyond simplistic dualistic contrasts, which inevitably replicate the same patterns of the colonial past, alienating a segment of the population.

It defines Indigenous Peoples as part of a democratic Bolivia, free to express themselves and their views and claims and demands, but not to deviate from Western liberal democracy, as that is portrayed also as the only acceptable system of (national) government. An example of the strength of this ideal is the comparison between Morales' government in Bolivia to autocratic regimes, though these remained unnamed and only vaguely alluded to. In many ways, it begs the question if that is in itself a new type of colonialism, as the irreducible and almighty nation-state as it is now constituted in the Western world seems to be the only possible way forward.

9 Conclusion

The analysis of the results brings forth a variety of different conclusions regarding the main questions of this thesis. The results show a wide variety of representation regarding Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia; whereas some publications are overtly pro-Indigenous, some come across as anti-Indigenous, or at the very least anti-Morales (it isn't always clear where one ends and the other begins), with some being heavily negative whereas others were mainly positive.

The data analysed revealed that the **Identity** frame was the most prevalent of all frames, being the most representative in three of the four newspapers analysed, with *La Razón* being the only exception (although even in this publication the aforementioned frame was only 1% away from being the most common one), accounting always for at least 22% of the total frames found in

each publication. This frame was portrayed under many different lights and with some contrasting results; whereas in *Cambio* the **Identity** frame was overwhelmingly pro-Indigenous and relied on dualistic interpretations, the same frame in *El Deber* was decidedly not and promoted the idea of a completely *mestizo* Bolivian society, accusing some (Morales, in particular) of being too partial to Indigenous Peoples' demands, effectively downplaying them. At the same time, *La Razón* was tremendously positive and pro-Indigenous in their casting of identity, without endorsing the Manichean and "us Vs them" discourse promoted by the State, whereas *Página Siete* conveyed an almost evenly balanced portrayal of this frame (in regards to positive and negative codes), combating the MAS monopoly on indigeneity, promoting a more revolutionary understanding of Indigenous identity and openly admonishing using ethnic divisions to pity Bolivians against Bolivians.

Some other frames were more unevenly dispersed; the **Credibility** frame, for instance, was always coded at 10% or less of the totality of frames within a certain newspaper, with the exception of *El Deber*, in which this frame constituted 17% of the total. Whereas the credibility of Indigenous Peoples was seldom a topic in the remaining three publications, *El Deber* recurred to this frame extensively in order to discredit Indigenous persons, or groups, and to denigrate their abilities to handle situations and behave appropriately, putting into question their own "Indianness" on multiple occasions (especially that of Evo Morales) or their capacity to fulfil governmental roles, for example.

Other frames were heavily tilted towards one side, with very little balance between the prevalence of negative and positive codes; somewhat expectedly, the **Conflict** and the **Responsibility** frames were overwhelmingly negative, with only the **Conflict** frame of *La Razón* being coded positively. The former frame was never coded higher than the fourth most common frame in each of the respective publications, while the latter was the second most prevalent frame in both *Cambio* and *El Deber* (representing more than 21% of all frames in both), the more openly partial and politicised newspapers analysed. The negative features of these two frames were best illustrated in *Página Siete*, when the ratio of negative to positive codes was almost of 9 to 1. There was also a temporality aspect when it came to these frames in the articles analysed in all publications, as the inescapable ghost of the colonial era and the profoundly real disenfranchisement endured by Indigenous Peoples loomed large. It is particularly hard to disentangle the fact that the *criollo* and *mestizo* societies were built upon the de-structuring of the Indigenous one previously in its place. Reflecting exactly that, most

of the **Conflict** frame occurrences refer to times of the past more so than today, even though not exclusively.

The **(De) Colonisation** frame is perhaps the one with the biggest "swings" in terms of prevalence across the different newspapers; whereas it was the second most common in *La Razón*, at 22%, and the third most common in both *Cambio* and *Página Siete*, at 21% and 17%, respectively, it was the least common frame in *El Deber*, accounting for only 7% of the totality of frames. It was almost entirely positive in both *La Razón* and *Cambio*, while it was negative in *El Deber* and in *Página Siete*. While this negative occurrence of the **(De) Colonisation** frame was common to both, the ways in which decolonisation was portrayed was quite different; whereas *El Deber* rejected the possibility of a decolonising national project (also reflected in the little importance given to the topic in the first place), *Página Siete* conveyed a message of being pro-decolonisation, albeit not under the terms and manners being conducted by the MAS government. It is the *way* in which the decolonisation attempts are being undertaken which garners the negative depiction from the latter newspaper, once again challenging the State and its powerful grip on indigeneity discourses.

Lastly, the **(Political) Agency** frame was also relatively volatile when it came to prevalence; it was the most common frame in *La Razón* (at 23%), the second most in *Página Siete* (at 19%), and the fifth most common in both *Cambio* and *El Deber* (at 12% and 14%, respectively). It was overwhelmingly positive in both *Cambio* and *La Razón*, while it was negative in the remaining two newspapers. Regardless of the overall prevalence of positive or negative codes, it was always code 11 ("**Does the article emphasise Indigenous Peoples' lack of resources for pursuing a desired action**?") which stood out the most, persistently highlighting the shortage of cultural, economic, and social capital amassed and at the disposal of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, regardless of how positively or negatively their political agency was portrayed in the publication.

Each outlet's representation of Indigenous Peoples followed a different script, according to their own stances and their political goals and agendas. *Cambio* followed a dualistic and confrontational line of thought, trying to, as Roberto Choque puts it, recover the history, identity, self-esteem and ancestral values of the Indigenous Peoples (Choque 2011: 43) to guide decolonisation, by portraying Indigenous groups as the "icons of a new plurinational society (Postero 2013: 17), in an attempt to build different epistemologies and means of knowledge (Ranta 2014). However, this dualistic discourse led to the publication occasionally reproducing

"the images and practices of display that commodify, exoticise or spectacularise" (Villarreal 2014: 91) Indigenous Peoples, monopolising the indigeneity discourse and sometimes acting as a mirror of the repressive and oppressive tactics of the pre-plurinational past, by presenting a binary discourse which pits Indigenous Peoples (pure and pre-contact) against non-Indigenous Bolivians (remnants of the colonial past).

El Deber, on the other hand, reproduced some ideas which have been criticised by many as perpetuating the republican *criollo* national project of European-inspired "enlightenment" (Unzueta 2000), blending surreptitious attacks on Indigenous Peoples with politically charged attacks on Evo Morales and the MAS. The publication tried to denigrate Evo's political project by delegitimising both the grassroots and Indigenous movements behind it (Quintanilla 2014), constantly framing Indigenous Peoples as easily manipulated, irrational and unreasonable (Lupien 2013), themselves victims to Morales' misdeeds. At the same time, it resorted to using a discourse which tried to defuse cries of discrimination by claiming that all Bolivians are *mestizos* and that no group should demand "special" treatment (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994). It represented Indigenous Peoples only as tokens used by Morales for his own political gain, and only favourably when they either represented the aforementioned "authentic", forest-dwelling Indian (Lucero 2006), the "sanitised, non-subversive and simplified", *mestizaje*-embracing *indio permitido* (Oviedo 2014: 65), non-politicised and *criollo*-approved, or when they were openly against the MAS political project or any action taken by it.

La Razón's portrayal of Indigenous Peoples was the least politically charged and perhaps the most positive. The newspaper put forth a tremendously favourable representation of Indigenous Peoples' political agency and participation, highlighting the massive positive changes that occurred in the last few decades in regards to the incorporation of Indigenous groups into the nation's fabric and towards decolonisation. It did so without omitting the many problems and the rampant inequality which still exists in the country. Much like *Cambio*, it portrayed Indigenous identity overwhelmingly positively and Indigenous Peoples as role models for the future of a Plurinational Bolivia (Postero 2013). While it didn't go as far as *Cambio* in advocating for a dualistic view on identity politics, *La Razón* repeatedly stressed the progress made and the steps into the right direction that had been led by Evo Morales.

Página Siete, lastly, was perhaps the most ambiguous of all publications. While it sometimes portrayed Indigenous Peoples, like *El Deber*, as easily manipulated and gullible, it advocated for a more radical understanding of indigeneity and of decolonisation, rejecting the MAS-

sponsored monopolised discourse on indigenous identity, and refusing to pit Bolivians against Bolivians, adhering to Patricia Chávez's and Pedro Portugal's premise that "using indigenous mythology and a discourse of recovering its culture to create a timeless image of itself would be another way of reproducing a colonial outlook" and "an obstacle to decolonisation" (Chávez 2011: 17). In a way, *Página Siete* framed the MAS-backed decolonisation as overly negative, advocating instead for self-representation (and self-understandings of indigeneity), which plays a key role in a (real) process of decolonisation (Rodríguez 2007). At the same time, it conveyed a balanced image of Indigenous Peoples identity, valuing it while at the same time rejecting the State's claims of ethnic purity and duality, in an enfranchisement attempt to liberate Indigenous Peoples and indigeneity from the oppressive discursive shackles of the MAS.

My own research encountered a few limitations and barriers to the completion of a more thorough analysis; as an illustrative example, the fact that only 6,20% of Bolivians had access to internet when Morales first assumed office in 2006 (a number which had risen to 41,9% by 2016, the first year of analysed data) reveals the narrow scope of this research, as Internet access and usage was still relatively marginal and so was the outreach of the newspapers' online publications and content. However, by the conclusion of this study, the internet usage in Bolivia had risen to 77,5% of the population, meaning that future researches will benefit from a more representative access to online resources.

Another limitation encountered during this study was the inability to measure adequately the salience and the proportionality of the total coverage dedicated to this topic, namely because such a study would be out of the scope and reach of this analysis, but also because it would be a gargantuan inquiry, even though it could provide a much better understanding of how Indigenous Peoples are represented in Bolivia. Additionally, perhaps a thorough article-by-article analysis can provide a different outlook on the matter, as the salience, importance and weight of certain frames is hard to measure and quantify. The importance of other media, namely television and radio, could also be studied in regards to representations of Indigenous Peoples, as its ubiquity and discourse-shaping power are perhaps superior to that of printed media and their respective online access repositories, even though the latter seem to be gaining ground at a frantic pace, much like all over the world, as media moves to a mainly web-based reporting.

In sum, Bolivian media, to some extent, still reproduces the same "essentialized construction" of Indigenous Peoples as "relics of the Pre-Columbian past" (Lazar 2008: 9, quoted in Ranta

2014: 59). Whether it is the State's newspaper, *Cambio*, falling victim to the binary opposition discursive trap which ossifies an idea of Indigenous Peoples, or *El Deber*'s vehement denial of the need to incorporate Indigenous demands for fairness, justice and equality, by hiding behind an all-diluting *mestizaje* claim, representation of Indigenous Peoples is still guided by conflictive premises which fail to account for all the elements of the Plurinational fabric. The less politically charged publications (like *La Razón*) seem to convey a more even-keeled portrayal of Indigenous Peoples, focusing on the "good things", the successes and achievements of Indigenous groups in regards to social, political and economic aspects, accepting their central role in the new Plurinational Bolivia and the need to keep on diminishing and eliminating structural inequalities and ingrained imbalances, racism and biases. *Página Siete*, lastly, presents perhaps the most sound and fairest representation of Indigenous Peoples; its frame distribution reveals it puts Identity, Political Agency and Decolonisation at the forefront of the public discourse, refusing to use Indigenous groups as tokens and advocating for a more status-quo challenging indigeneity, inclusive and non-divisive, appealing to a rejection of binary oppositions between sections of the Bolivian society, stoking patriotism above ethnic-inspired notions of purity, like those promoted by MAS.

In short, this study illustrates the social duality that coexists sometimes paradoxically in many places in Latin America and markedly in Bolivia. On the one hand, some perpetuate the idea and stereotype of a pure and precolonial Indigenous to be wielded as a political shield of sorts, a tool for personal electoral gain and advancement, whilst at the same time replicating a similarly colonial discourse which frames non-Indigenous as a contrasting and lesser "other", ostracising sects of its own population; on the other hand, others portray Indigenous Peoples as symbols of backwardness, a past to be overcome on the constant march towards "development". Another aspect which this research brings to light is the deeply polarised and politicised discourse which permeates these newspapers. As vehicles of information, the publications analysed convey heavily biased stances, widening the gap between one side and the other in an already deeply divided society like Bolivia's. This polarisation acts as a tool of division, stoking flames of conflict and eroding the fertile middle grounds of dialogue, debate and compromise.

Indigenous Peoples' representations in Bolivia are, therefore, quite divergent, even amongst bigger and mainstream outlets, creating their own kind of echo chamber; depending on the media consumed and the sociopolitical predispositions of the readers, two quite divergent portrayals are real and coexist side by side. This very contradiction could be an object of future studies, in an attempt to study what is the role of the media in broadening social divides. This

is especially true in a society like Bolivia, where the differences between the “haves” and the “have-nots” are stark and the media is openly and partially biased, enacting a role that is more opinion-based and less informative than the common canons of journalistic objectivity.

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Table of codes, dimensions, and frames

Dimension Number	Item – To detect the particular dimension of the frame at the paragraph level
Conflict Frame	
1 (negative)	Does the article describe confrontations/disagreements between Indigenous Peoples and institutions?
2 (positive)	Does the article describe how Indigenous Peoples or institutions with different interests have reached an agreement about something?
3 (negative)	Do Indigenous Peoples and institutions reproach one another?
4 (positive)	Does the article describe how Indigenous Peoples and other groups/ideologies can coexist peacefully?
Credibility Frame	
5 (negative)	Does the article contain expressions of concern or doubt as to whether Indigenous Peoples can handle/be trusted regarding an issue/problem because of some difficult circumstance/situation?
6 (positive)	Does the article emphasise Indigenous Peoples' ability to handle an issue/situation despite difficult circumstances?
7 (negative)	Does the article evaluate how Indigenous Peoples are acting/behaving worse than expected in a particular situation?
8 (positive)	Does the article evaluate how Indigenous Peoples are acting/behaving according to or above expectations in a particular situation?
(Political) Agency Frame	
9 (negative)	Does the article describe Indigenous Peoples' political agency negatively (or as being excessive)?
10 (positive)	Does the article describe Indigenous Peoples' political agency positively (or lacking)?
11 (negative)	Does the article emphasise Indigenous Peoples' lack of resources for pursuing a desired action?
12 (positive)	Does the article emphasise Indigenous Peoples' degree of sufficient or abundant resources for pursuing a desired action?
Identity Frame	
13 (negative)	Does the article present Indigenous Peoples' identity markers in a negative light?
14 (positive)	Does the article present Indigenous Peoples' identity markers in a positive light?
15 (negative)	Does the article deny identity markers to Indigenous Peoples?
16 (positive)	Does the article ascribe identity markers to Indigenous Peoples?
17 (negative)	Does the article mention pre-Columbian identity markers negatively/as illegitimate/undesirable?
18 (positive)	Does the article mention pre-Columbian identity markers positively/as legitimate/desirable?
19 (negative)	Does the article present Indigenous identity as opposed to *Criollo*/Western identity?
20 (positive)	Does the article equate/relate Indigenous identity to *Criollo*/Western identity?
(de) Colonisation Frame	
21 (negative)	Does the article describe a negative/difficult way towards achieving decolonisation?
22 (positive)	Does the article describe a positive/possible way towards achieving decolonisation?

23 (negative)	Does the article frame decolonisation as illegitimate?
24 (positive)	Does the article frame decolonisation as legitimate?
25 (negative)	Does the article mention the colonial time positively?
26 (positive)	Does the article mention the colonial time negatively?
Responsibility Frame	
27 (negative)	Does the article suggest that some group/institution is/should be held responsible for a particular situation?
28 (positive)	Does the article credit some group/institution with having solved a particular situation?
29 (negative)	Does the article describe how Indigenous Peoples have been/are affected by a particular situation?
30 (positive)	Does the article describe how Indigenous Peoples have benefitted/benefit from a particular situation?

Frames and codes






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
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09 - Political Agency Frame - IP...
10 - Political Agency Frame - IP...
11 - Political Agency Frame - IP lack...
12 - Political Agency Frame - IP...
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15 - Identity Frame - Deny IP...
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17 - Identity Frame - Pre-columbian...
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19 - Identity Frame - Indigenous...
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
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
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29 - Responsibility Frame - Affected...
30 - Responsibility Frame -...


Frames in *Página Siete*
69, 14%
53, 10%
86, 17%
150, 30%
98, 19%
50, 10%
Conflict
Credibility
Decolonisation
Identity
Political Agency
Responsibility


Negative dimensions
Code occurrence in *Página Siete*
Positive dimensions
35
4
25
5
10
16
11
16
21
33
43
1
26
24
17
13
6
14
28
22
27
5
34
5
0
15
9
4
35
2
01 - Conflict Frame - Negative...
02 - Conflict Frame - Positive...
03 - Conflict Frame - Mutual...
04 - Conflict Frame - Peaceful...
05 - Credibility Frame -...
06 - Credibility Frame - IP...
07 - Credibility Frame - IP...
08 - Credibility Frame - IP...
09 - Political Agency Frame -...
10 - Political Agency Frame -...
11 - Political Agency Frame -...
12 - Political Agency Frame -...
13 - Identity Frame - IP...
14 - Identity Frame - IP...
15 - Identity Frame - Deny IP...
16 - Identity Frame -...
17 - Identity Frame - Pre...
18 - Identity Frame - Pre...
19 - Identity Frame -...
20 - Identity Frame -...
21 - Decolonisation Frame -...
22 - Decolonisation Frame -...
23 - Decolonisation Frame -...
24 - Decolonisation Frame -...
25 - Decolonisation Frame -...
26 - Decolonisation Frame -...
27 - Responsibility Frame -...
28 - Responsibility Frame -...
29 - Responsibility Frame -...
30 - Responsibility Frame -...